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When it comes to the topic of mental illness, there are three broad areas of concern that 
are of interest to all of us as human beings—and to the theorists, researchers, and clinicians 
who wish to offer help—besides knowing what our symptoms are.  First, we might be 
interested in finding out some normative facts about ourselves as individuals, such as 
whether or not we are mentally healthy, perhaps to what extent, and how this should affect 
our motivations. A second area of concern involves descriptive facts our minds. In what 
ways do we deviate from typical human psychological nature, and what implications does 
this have? A third concern is about diagnosis, the familiar labels like ‘bipolar 1’ and 
‘obsessive compulsive’ which inform our very being. Ought any of these apply to us? 
Clinical psychiatry, understood broadly as a practice which integrates science, 
theory, and clinical observation for the purpose of understanding and promoting mental 
health, is the most vital tool we have for answering these questions, and combatting the 
suffering caused by mental illness. Without a critical understanding of what good clinical 
reasoning consists in, however, it is simultaneously our most dangerous tool. Without it, we 
risk amplifying suffering rather than combatting it, by failing to distinguish and respond 
appropriately to illness and health. This project examines the nature of clinical reasoning 
from a theoretical perspective, by proposing some conditions for a discipline which pays 
heed to psychiatry’s dual nature as a science and as an evaluative system—with the hope that 
a proper understanding of mental illness and mental disorder will follow from an 







“I am but mad north-north-west: when the wind is 
Southerly I know a hawk from a handsaw.” 
--Hamlet Act 2 Scene 2, William Shakespeare 
 
1. What is Good Clinical Reasoning? 
On September 13
th
, 2014, 32-year-old Kamilah Brock, entered NYPD precinct PSA 6 to 
find the whereabouts of her impounded car. Claiming she was making them nervous, 
police handcuffed Brock and forcibly removed her to Harlem Hospital. During her 
involuntary stay there, Brock was repeatedly sedated with lorazepam and lithium against 
her will despite showing no signs of violent behavior. In an effort to gain her freedom, 
Brock repeatedly told hospital staff—truthfully—that she was a gainfully employed banker, 
and that President Obama followed her on Twitter. Hospital staff made no effort to check 
these claims, called them delusional, and made their repudiation a condition of her release. 
Brock was held there for eight days (Law Offices, 2015).
1
 
Exactly a month later on November 13
th
, 37-year-old mother Tanisha Anderson, 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, was killed by police responding to a non-emergency call 
from her family (Beres, 2015). Anderson is just one of many individuals in recent years, 
with history of mental illness, who have had the misfortune of becoming victims of police 
violence when they in fact sought aid (Santos & Goode, 2014; Ernst & Putzel, 2014). 
Especially in cases of threatened suicide, the prospect of calling 911 is a growing fear 
among loved ones. And where there are not loved-ones to look to for support, many 
sufferers of mental illness in the United States end up in prison (Carey et al., 2014).
                                                            
1
 Apparently, not much has changed since American psychologist David Rosenhan’s experiments placing 
‘pseudopatients’ in psychiatric hospitals, when after between seven and fifty-two days, all eight individuals 
were discharged; but only after accepting their ‘diagnoses’ (1973). 
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Clinical psychiatry, understood broadly as a practice which integrates science, 
theory, and clinical observation for the purpose of understanding and promoting mental 
health, is the most vital tool we have for combatting the suffering caused by mental illness. 
Without a critical understanding of what good clinical reasoning consists in, however, it is 
simultaneously our most dangerous tool. Without it, we risk amplifying suffering rather 
than combatting it—either as in Anderson’s case by failing to respond appropriately to 
genuine illness, or as in Brock’s by failing to respond appropriately to genuine cases of 
health.
2
 Developing and engaging in an empirically minded and normatively adequate 
clinical practice, then, is necessary in order to provide better care for ourselves and others. 
With this project, I aim to open up a new avenue for research in the philosophy of 
psychiatry which considers the nature of clinical reasoning from a theoretical perspective, 
by proposing some conditions for a discipline which pays heed to psychiatry’s dual nature 
as a science and as an evaluative system.
3
 I offer one condition in each of my three primary 
chapters. To be clear at the outset, these conditions are not intended to be sufficient for 
characterizing clinical psychiatry. I would be happy if others were revealed by future 
research. I also do not intend to argue for any positive account of mental illness or mental 
disorder. Rather I hope that a proper understanding of these and other concepts will follow 
from an understanding of the enterprise of clinical psychiatry itself—this leaves a vast space 
for future philosophical work, and in my concluding chapter I will outline some open 
questions that strike me as particularly fruitful. 
Even so, it is hard to begin a discussion about clinical reasoning without at least 
some basic understanding of how terms like ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’ are used. 
Before outlining the arguments of each chapter, then, it will be useful to lay some 
groundwork. In the next section, I will try to elucidate a general trend in the literature, and 
note how I will be using these terms in my project. I am less concerned with how well or 
poorly my usages fit the trend, than I am about clearly stipulating how I will use the terms 
                                                            
2
 It is also not a coincidence that clinical psychiatry represents an even greater danger to marginalized groups 
(both Brock and Anderson are black women living in the States). Concerns of social justice disparities in 
mental healthcare are an additional motivation for my project (for more see: Woolfolk, 2002; Poland & 
Caplan, 2004; Banaji, 2013; Carey et al., 2014). 
3
 Over the past few decades, philosophers of psychiatry have been making strides in three broad areas: the 
thorny conceptual issues that surround psychiatry as a science, the very idea of mental illness, and how 
clinical phenomena can illuminate issues in philosophy of mind (Murphy, 2015b). 
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going forward. Then, in section three, I will give a quick sketch of the relevant conception 
of the discipline of psychiatry that employs these terms. A preview of my primary chapters 
appears in section four. 
Before moving on, a quick note on the most confounding piece of terminology in 
philosophy these days—the word ‘we’: In the most general case, ‘we’ is ideally used to refer 
to the group human beings, humankind, thinking things, or, perhaps, persons; as in we 
tend to think that… we simply don’t know whether… or, we can agree that. The rationale 
for this usage seems to rest on the idea that philosophical argument and philosophical 
thought are universally valuable and universally applicable enterprises. However, there is 
some controversy concerning the value and role of philosophical intuitions in making 
philosophical arguments.
4
 Especially in the analytic tradition, much work proceeds via the 
introspective and reasoning capabilities of trained experts, that is, philosophers. That the 
majority of professional analytic philosophers have been and continue to be Anglo 
American men has only recently been conceived of as a major biasing issue. As it turns out, 
analytic philosophers aren’t great representatives of human thought (Henrich et al., 2010). 
Because the overarching theme of my project concerns individual variation in the 
structure and content of human the human mind (or, if you prefer, mind/brain), I am 
particularly concerned with this issue. At the same time, ‘we’ can be stylistically 
indispensable. I’ve already used it twice. Therefore, I will strive to use ‘we’ as shorthand for 
‘we human beings’ only in those cases where the entire group is the appropriate referent. 
When referring to a more restricted group I will do so explicitly by saying things like ‘we 
philosophers’ or ‘we in the United States’. 
 
2. Terminology 
Consider the following case. Allie makes an appointment with a therapist because she has 
been feeling melancholy and unmotivated, which has interfered with her work and social 
life. What does it mean for her that she seeks a diagnosis? Presumably it is not to be told 
that she feels sad, which is something she already knows. Imagine Allie had gone to her 
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 For more see the Intellectual Humility Project, an international endeavor among philosophers and 
psychologists interested in the cross-cultural stability of philosophical intuitions (2013). 
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physician for a cough, only to be diagnosed with something called ‘coughing disease’. This 
is laughably uninformative. Yet many who seek assistance for psychological symptoms like 
Allie’s have just this experience. Clinical psychiatry today stands apart from physical 
medicine in that there is no clear distinction between symptoms and the conditions that 
underlie them. This points to one of the biggest stumbling blocks for explaining and 
understanding concepts like ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’. Namely, many of the 
diagnoses we are most familiar with, like ‘depression’ and ‘anxiety’, pick out sets of 
disjunctive and overlapping symptoms, rather than any underlying facts that might explain 
these symptoms. 
There are three broad areas of concern that might be of interest to Allie, and to 
other theorists, researchers, and practitioners, besides knowing what her symptoms are.  
First, Allie might be interested in finding out some normative fact about herself as an 
individual—whether or not she is mentally healthy, perhaps to what extent, and how this 
should affect her motivations. A second area of concern involves descriptive facts about 
Allie’s mind. In what ways does she deviate from typical human psychological nature, and 
what implications does this have for what kind of human agent she is? Knowing these facts 
will help answer questions like why is this happening and how can I change it? A third 
concern is about diagnostic kinds, the interactive social kinds which take the form of those 
labels like ‘bipolar 1’ and ‘obsessive compulsive’. Ought any of these apply to Allie? 
These three, intimately related concerns can be roughly distinguished by the kinds 
of facts which are supposed to explain Allie’s symptoms. To answer the question of why 
Allie is feeling sad we might report an evaluative fact (Allie is sick), a descriptive fact (Allie 
has a chronic surplus of cortisol in her system), or a classificatory fact (Allie has Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD)). Each may be a satisfactory explanation for Allie. 
Unfortunately these facts can interact in complex ways. As a result, it is next to impossible 
to tell, in practice whether a particular theorist thinks any of these facts entail the others, or 
what the normative significance is of the explanation a theorist gives. As philosopher of 
psychiatry Dominic Murphy puts it, “there is widespread agreement that our thinking about 
disease pays attention to both human values and biological phenomena, and it is not always 
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easy to tell… whether a given analysis is descriptive or prescriptive” (Murphy, §6, 2015a).5 
To my mind, a number of disagreements over the nature of psychopathology—for example 
how and whether mental diseases are related to physical diseases, how they are delineated, 
and whether they are in some sense ‘constructed’—rest on this ambiguity. It interferes with 
our ability to keep concepts like ‘illness’, ‘disorder’, and ‘disease’ disentangled.  
Clearer conceptual tools are needed for future discussions that can help benefit 
people like Allie and alleviate her mental suffering. Employing a strict theoretical boundary 
between the target phenomena of clinical psychiatry’s evaluative, descriptive, and 
classificatory goals is a good starting point. Therefore I propose, first, that the terms ‘health’ 
and ‘illness’ be used in a strictly normative sense. Regardless of whether Allie is typical or 
atypical with respect to her symptoms or their underlying causes, to say that she is ill carries 
the implication that there is something about her that ought to be corrected. It is a value 
judgement. To put this in psychological terms then, I mean ‘being mentally ill’ to describe 
any way of being in which an individual's flourishing
6
 is significantly impaired or limited by 
some features of their psychology. To be mentally ill is to fall below some standard of 
flourishing as a result of certain objective psychological facts. Exactly what the right 
standards are is an interesting question I take up later in Chapter 2.  
How should mental health be understood in contrast with mental illness? I mean 
‘being mentally healthy’ to describe any way of being in which an individual's flourishing is 
not so limited. On this way of thinking, mental health is defined negatively as the absence 
of illness. Importantly, we need not think that this poses problems for using the term 
‘healthy’ in a positive way—to capture a good degree of flourishing rather than just meeting 
some minimum standard. In a recent paper, S. Andrew Schroeder argues that this 
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 Take for example the debate between objectivists and constructivists over the concept of health in medicine. 
Briefly, objectivists hold that descriptive facts about the human body alone can ground distinctions between 
sick and healthy bodies, while constructivists hold that symptoms or their causes must, in addition, be 
disvalued with respect to human interests (Murphy, 2015a). Many theorists in both camps end up relying on 
‘disorder’, ‘disease’, and ‘illness’ as stipulated terms to differentiate between descriptive and prescriptive 
claims, with individual differences as to which means what. One must engage closely with a particular author 
to tell whether a claim like ‘Allie has a mental disorder’ carries normative implications, or whether this just 
reports the existence of some deviation. 
6
 This can be a tricky piece of terminology in normative ethics, and I do not want too much to rest on it here. 
For now a naïve notion will do, where flourishing is not a technical term and is more or less synonymous with 
terms like well-being, welfare, or eudemonia. I will have more to say on how evaluative concepts like these 
interact with our thinking about mental health in my concluding chapter. 
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confusion stems from overlooking the possibility of comparativist theory of health, where 
to say that ‘X is healthy’ is to claim that X belongs to a range of individuals in some class, 
where differences in that range are still differences in health (2012). On a comparativist 
view of mental health, two individuals can be healthy, while one is healthier than another, 
or flourishing to a greater degree. I will follow Schroeder here in taking a comparativist 
view. 
My second proposal concerns the targets of clinical psychiatry’s descriptive and 
classificatory goals. In short, the predicate ‘has a mental disorder’ can be ambiguous 
between the purely descriptive ‘is psychologically atypical’ and the evaluative ‘is 
psychologically atypical and ill as a result’. I will use it only in the second sense. To say that 
Allie has a mental disorder is to make both a descriptive and an evaluative claim. This may 
seem like a fairly radical move, but it is one which I think is entirely warranted. 
To see why, consider how the science of psychopathology is currently conceived, 
the discipline that attempts to distinguish between kinds of mental illness by investigating its 
underlying causes. The product of this labor, a nosology, should taxonomize different 
psychological conditions, already assumed to underlie mental illness, into useful diagnostic 
categories.
7
 Mental disorder, then, can be usefully defined in terms of mental illness. I 
mean ‘has a mental disorder’ to describe a person who is mentally ill when the features of 
their psychology which impair flourishing fit one or more such categories. In Allie’s case, 
she has a disorder because her chronic surplus of cortisol is the cause of her suffering. This 
usage should transfer a kind of normative status to the diagnostic categories of a nosology, 
such that MDD, as a mental disorder, is a kind of mental illness. A good nosology fulfills a 
classificatory goal. It allows us to make evaluative claims like ‘Allie is depressed’.  
It may be objected that labels like MDD, when properly deployed, are not meant to 
carry normative content at all but rather pick out a set of noteworthy symptoms and 
underlying causes. I am sympathetic to this concern, but I believe that this usage results in a 
dangerous source of confusion. To see why, consider the possibility that someone has a 
psychological condition that fits some descriptive criteria even though they are mentally 
                                                            
7
 Much work in the philosophy of psychiatry has mirrored psychopathology by trying to provide a theoretical 
account of just what these categories are and how they function. I intend the term ‘diagnostic category’ to 
apply very generally, to point out a label’s role in a classificatory scheme without specifying further which 
scheme is at play. 
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healthy, for example, Guinness World Record holder Scott Flansburg. Scott can mentally 
compute mathematical calculations faster than almost any other human. Unlike the rest of 
us, he uses his motor cortex to complete these calculations, the part of the brain 
responsible for making complex snap decisions such as catching a ball (Flansburg, 2015). 
Let’s say Scott fits the hypothetical diagnostic category ‘human calculator syndrome’. 
Human calculator syndrome is certainly statistically abnormal, though without making 
undue assumptions about his personal life, it seems reasonable to think of Scott as mentally 
healthy. If mental disorders are stripped of their normative content, we would owe Allie the 
same courtesy as Scott. We would need to withhold judgment about whether or not Allie is 
mentally ill after learning that she has MDD. But this is not how these labels typically 
function. Indeed it would be difficult to prevent the inference that Allie is unwell. Thus 
follows the motivation for stipulating that an individual who fits a diagnostic category has a 
mental disorder only if they are mentally ill—if their flourishing is inhibited by their 
psychological condition. 
Certainly, it is an open question so far whether the list of mental disorders is 
identical with the list of conditions that are of interest from a perspective of 
psychopathology. If it would be wrong to say that Scott has a mental disorder, how should 
we describe him? To avoid confusion, I will use a further piece of terminology ‘typical 
deviation’ to describe statistically abnormal psychological conditions which are not 
implicated in mental illness. Regardless of whether Allie is healthy or ill, to say that she has 
some typical deviation is to classify her as belonging to some interesting category with 
respect to her symptoms or their underlying cause, with no normative implications 
whatsoever. Though a catalogue of typical deviations would be different from a nosology of 
mental disorders, the two taxonomies could mutually inform each other in practice. Still it 
is crucial to keep them conceptually separate, as they have different extensions. If the 
notion of typical deviation gained a place in public discourse, we would need to take care 
that it would not carry normative implications. 
I should also preempt one confusion that might follow from certain expectations of 
what diagnostic categories are supposed to do. Specifically, it might be thought that, while 
‘mental disorder’ is not a natural kind, specific disorders like MDD or their underlying 
typical deviations are, such that everyone diagnosed with MDD shares a kind of essence. 
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No part of my project should be construed as relying on this assumption. I agree 
with thinkers like Şerife Tekin and Ian Hacking, who stress that mental disorders are 
interactive kinds that change in response to their uses by human beings (Hacking, 2006; 
Tekin, 2014a; 2014b). As Tekin helpfully summarizes, “the encounter with mental 
disorder changes an individual’s self-concept and behavior, and it is not easy—if indeed 
possible—to discriminate the influence of diagnosis of mental disorder from that of the 
mental disorder itself” (p. 228, 2014a). In other words, a mental disorder like MDD 
changes how a subject behaves, both because of changes in brain chemistry, and because 
the subject consciously alters her behavior in response to new information gained from the 
label itself. These behaviors then get reified as parts of the diagnosis, causing MDD to 
change over time. A particularly striking example of this process occurred when an 
underfunded hospital in Argentina re-diagnosed its patients—switching from a Kraepelinian 
scheme to the DSM standards—in order to work with a French drug company. Overnight, 
patients experienced their symptoms in new ways (Lakoff, 2006). As Hacking describes the 
case, “such are the mechanisms of cultural imperialism” (Hacking, 2013).8 
Tekin suggests that it may be necessary to leave aside the subjective in order to 
taxonomize mental disorders (Tekin, 2014b). Murphy agrees, arguing that “psychiatric 
diagnoses should be seen as referring to idealizations… that abstract away from the details 
of their realization in patients” (p. 105, 2014). Additionally, there may be social reasons to 
think of metal disorders as natural kinds. For example to allow patient groups and charities 
to form around mental disorders as “distinct and visible brands” (Adam, p. 418, 2013). Of 
course, the scientific adequacy of these idealizations rests on our ability to find boundaries 
in the structure of the mind that correspond to them. Philosopher Kathryn Tabb calls this 
the assumption of diagnostic discrimination, and many recent thinkers, including myself, 
are beginning to doubt its value (for more see: Tabb, ms; Friesen, ms; Theuer & Hartner, 
2015; Tekin, 2014a & Mallon, ms). For my part, nothing I have to say should turn on the 
question of whether that assumption can be vindicated.  
One further thing to note about the relationship between mental illness and mental 
disorder as I have outlined the terms so far, is that the possibility remains open for 
                                                            
8
 See also: Heaton (2013). 
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someone to be mentally ill, but not a have a particular mental disorder. That is, an 
individual’s flourishing may be inhibited by some psychological feature, without them fitting 
a particular diagnostic category. This is a possibility that might be closed, however, by 
simply naming the condition. I wish to remain agnostic about the advisability of taking this 
route, though many, including myself, tend to think that there are conditions both clinical 
and subclinical which, while not mental disorders per se, have very much to do with mental 
health. Brain injury, bereavement, and lacking coping skills are just some illustrative 
examples. 
To recap, I will use these terms in the following ways: 
 
(1) Mental illness—refers to any way of being in which an individual's flourishing is 
significantly impaired or limited by some features of their psychology irrespective of 
what those features are.  
(2) Mental disorder—refers to a psychological condition fitting one or more diagnostic 
categories that causes mental illness. 
(3) Typical deviation—refers to a psychological condition fitting one or more diagnostic 
categories irrespective of whether there is mental illness. 
 
3. An Initial Case for a Two-Stage View 
Psychiatry is often conceived of as the study and treatment of mental illness, emotional 
disturbance, and some kinds of abnormal behavior. But what is mental illness, in contrast 
to physical illness? And what makes a behavior abnormal?  These questions have deep 
roots in the philosophical literature. I am most interested, however, in the contrast that this 
very rudimentary definition sets up: namely that psychiatry is thought of both as a scientific 
study and as a practice of treating people. As psychiatrist Lloyd A. Wells puts it in a recent 
blog post, good clinical reasoning, “is not a laboratory exercise but one which involves a 
doctor, a patient, and the world around them” (Wells, 2014). 
Of course, both of these ways of conceiving of psychiatry are crucial to the 
discipline, and why they are at odds may not at first be apparent. On one hand, we are in 
the nascent stages of discovering facts about the human mind, and psychiatry, as a science, 
10 
 
ought to be consilient with psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and the other 
sciences of the human mind and behavior. As psychiatric research develops, its discoveries 
should be grounded in objective facts about the individuals it characterizes. On the other 
hand, it is impossible to divorce the study of mental illness from its subjects. Psychiatry is 
meant somehow to help those who suffer from mental illness, not just examine and 
understand them. It addresses a very urgent and practical problem, the promotion of 
mental health and reduction of human suffering and its economic costs.
9
 So while it is true 
that psychiatry must be objective in the above sense, it is also an essentially normative 
enterprise. Evaluating patients’ welfare is crucial to improving it. As philosopher of 
psychiatry George Graham says, “this is not just because the purpose of medicine is 
premised on the disvalue of pain and reduced life expectancy… But it is due to the fact that 
the notions of bodily health and physical well-being are evaluative or normative though and 
through” (p. 93, 2010).  
The evaluative and descriptive sides of psychiatry reveal two goals, to heal and to 
explain, which are at once complimentary and competitive.
10
 To see how they compete, 
one need only consider how labor is divided among mental health professionals. Psychiatry 
is by its very nature interdisciplinary, and the psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, therapists, 
and researchers
11
 who make up the field have differing levels of investment in healing 
versus explaining, as well as differing levels of training in the scientific and practical 
knowledge needed to accomplish each goal. It is not well understood what constitutes good 
clinical reasoning in any particular context, and mental health professionals’ varying 
priorities have so far resulted in varying (and often incommensurable) theoretical 
constructs. It is not clear, for example, how a researcher uncovering the neurobiological 
mechanisms which regulate serotonin production ought to relate to the diagnostic 
categories we are most familiar with in taxonomies like the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), or how a 
therapist practicing Freudian psychoanalysis or cognitive behavioral therapy should take on 
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 Especially at a time when the World Health Organization estimates that mental and substance use disorders 
are the leading cause of disability worldwide, making up 14% of the global burden of disease (2015). 
10
 Many thanks to Kathryn Tabb and Phoebe Friesen for discussions on this point. 
11
 To say nothing of the geneticists, neurobiologists, pharmacologists, cognitive scientists, social workers, or 
lawyers who specialize in mental health/illness. 
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board new discoveries about the role of serotonin. While there have been some attempts 
to unify psychiatry’s descriptive and evaluative aspects (for more see: Friesen, ms), 
philosophers of psychiatry and other theoreticians have traditionally focused just on one 
goal or the other. 
Phoebe Friesen is another philosopher of psychiatry interested in the tension 
between psychiatry’s evaluative and descriptive goals. In a recent paper she suggests that, 
rather than attempt to integrate these goals, theorists should favor an approach which 
“encourages an exploratory and open ended approach to ontology within psychiatric 
research” (Friesen, ms). Her approach, which she calls ontological pluralism, is an attempt 
to provide a workable metaphysics for concepts in psychiatry. She asks theorists to get 
comfortable with the idea that, while mental illness is sometimes reducible to underlying 
neuropathology, at other times it is best understood by higher level cognitive phenomena 
which are not exhaustively constituted by brain states.  
While not directly concerned with the metaphysics of mental disorder, my project 
is sympathetic to Friesen’s position. Good clinical reasoning must make use of both 
descriptive information from the sciences, and evaluative information from our best 
normative theories, and this highlights a tension between the arenas of fact and value at play 
in psychiatric practice and research. Indeed, when it comes to being scientifically minded 
in particular, part of what is interesting in the philosophy of psychiatry is determining just 
what psychiatry’s relationship to science is—and what it should be. For while it is generally 
agreed that part of scientific respectability is consilience with the other sciences of the mind 
and human behavior, the discipline has been less than successful at this task (Murphy, 
2006). Psychiatric diagnosis is often guided by prevailing norms and values in spite of 
empirical evidence. 
To illustrate of psychiatry’s problematic relationship to science, there are clear 
historical cases of diagnostic categories which functioned as nothing more than a 
pseudoscientific means of institutionalized oppression—some of which are former 
diagnoses of the DSM—such as hysteria and homosexuality (Murphy, 2006). These labels 
refer to sets of behaviors, irrespective of any underlying, stable, objective entity that is 
investigable from the point of view of psychology, biochemistry, or any other medical 
science. If we are to take psychiatry seriously as a scientific endeavor, its nosology should 
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not merely pathologize counter-normative behaviors, and it should not characterize 
individuals as unwell who aren’t. Any discipline which merely enforces cultural norms in 
this way, is paternalistic. I will have a good deal more to say about the problem of 
paternalism in my second chapter. 
For now it is important to note how these cases introduce the worry that psychiatric 
practice today is also merely a way of pathologizing unwanted behaviors, and that its 
prescriptions do not actually encourage psychological flourishing. In fact, psychiatry’s lack 
of success at remaining objective has inspired various forms of antirealism about mental 
disorders (Doris & Robins, 2007). But the jump from the worry that particular diagnoses 
are fraudulent or politically motivated to the objection that mental disorders are ‘not real’ 
or have no underlying natural causal explanation is unwarranted. We should take seriously 
the idea that there is genuine mental suffering in individuals that can be explained naturally, 
whether by recourse to social and environmental facts, or underlying neuropathology, or 
both. As philosophers Sarah Robins and John Doris reflect in their review of Psychiatry in 
the Scientific Image, 
“…examples of prejudice cloaked in pseudo-science are regrettably 
common in the history of psychiatric medicine, common enough to 
provoke denials that there is such a thing as mental illness (e.g., Szasz 1987). 
Yet we embrace such a general skepticism at our peril – and the peril of 
those who suffer. Depression, for example, is a widespread and life-
threatening affliction, estimated by the World Health Organization to be 
the 4th leading cause of productivity loss worldwide” (Doris & Robins, 
2007). 
This peril is not to be underestimated. Psychiatry must come to terms with its dual 
nature as an empirically grounded science of the mind, and as an evaluative system that 
requires a normative theory. The view of clinical psychiatry I am interested in, in this 
project, therefore, employs a two-stage methodology. This is a common, and effective 
response to psychiatry’s past failures. In short, a two-stage view takes psychiatry’s target to 
be those psychological phenomena which cause harm to individuals. On this picture, one 
way of specifying the target is by investigating the nature of harm, and another is by 
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investigating the nature of the human mind. The tools which are appropriate for one 
investigation are not necessarily appropriate for the other, hence the two stages. 
One of the strongest reasons for endorsing a two-stage methodology which 
separates clinical psychiatry’s descriptive and evaluative projects is that we are not driven to 
skepticism about the reality of mental illness (Murphy, 2006; Doris & Robins, 2007). The 
two-stage picture allows us to resist a commonly made move from the worry that particular 
diagnoses are fraudulent to the objection that psychiatry itself is a non-objective, non-
scientific endeavor, and admits a role for clinical psychiatry in bettering lives (Murphy, 
2006). It pays due respect to the danger of politically or socially motivated diagnoses while 
at the same time endorsing realism.  
Further, when psychiatry is grounded in objective facts about the individuals it 
characterizes, the possibility for culturally relative norms about what behaviors are and 
aren’t desirable to compromise psychiatric practice is limited. 
On a two-stage picture, addressing the tension between fact and value gives 
psychiatry an open-ended ‘soft-naturalism’ where mental disorder is not a natural kind. As 
Murphy explains, 
“[m]ental disorder is a concept like pest, weed, or vermin. Weeds and 
vermin are not natural kinds, but they are made up of… kinds that can be 
explained empirically. Furthermore, whether something counts as a weed or 
a vermin depends on human interests in a way that allows the class to grow 
over time, or vary across projects… Folk thinking does not determine in 
advance whether a species is a pest, nor does it make scientific investigation 
of a species of pest into a normative endeavor” (Murphy, p. 98-99, 2006, 
italics in original). 
A second strength of a two-stage methodology is that its focus on causal etiologies 
and consilience with contemporary psychology and cognitive neuroscience gives it a 
scientifically reputable methodology. This allows the discipline of psychiatry to be situated 
as consilient with the other sciences of the mind such that it can better identify, explain, and 
treat mental disorders than its competitors. This may sound obvious to the empirically 
minded, but one of the things Murphy demonstrates very well in his book is how lack of 
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consideration for the sciences of the mind and human behavior stymies psychiatric 
research. As he argues,  
“[o]ur current demarcation of mental disorder is scientifically 
uninteresting… the superordinate concept of mental disorder, as it stands, 
does not pick out a nonarbitrary class. And as well as suggesting that the 
conceptual issues need to be reframed, this arbitrariness has scientific 
consequences. It can obstruct our ability to generalize across related 
conditions, mislead us into thinking that disciplinary boundaries correspond 
to an interesting break in nature, and stymie the linkage of psychiatric 
research in other disciplines, notably the cognitive sciences” (Murphy, p. 61, 
2006). 
The controversy surrounding the classification of mental disorders in the DSM is a good 
example of the confusion that can result from starting with some folk concept or 
pretheoretic intuition about what mental disorders are.
12
 Consilience with the sciences is 
itself an invaluable defense against the pernicious influence of norms of human interest. 
Ultimately, these two virtues demonstrate a commitment to good clinical reasoning. 
Good clinical reasoning in this sense is thinking about mental illness and mental health 
which: 
 
(1) is consilient with the other sciences of the mind/brain, and 
(2) employs a normative theory with properly justified evaluative standards for psychiatric 
diagnosis. 
 
                                                            
12
 Ian Hacking is another philosopher who shares the above concerns about the state of contemporary 
psychiatric practice. He is critical of how the diagnoses of the DSM-V systematically overlap symptoms to the 
point where they are virtually undifferentiable. In his review of the book Hacking writes, “[t]he DSM is not a 
representation of the nature or reality of the varieties of mental illness… it is founded on a wrong appreciation 
of the nature of things” (Hacking, 2013). Indeed, a quick glance through the various incarnations of the DSM 
makes the business of psychiatric diagnosis seem absurdly ad hoc, heterogeneous, overinclusive, and prone to 
the influence of arbitrary social, political, and historical factors. Perhaps it is because the DSM is first and 
foremost a document of convenience—the best way of getting clinicians on the same page, or of getting 
insurance companies to pay out (First & Westen, 2007). Or perhaps the best explanation lies in the DSM’s 
rejection of causal explanation in favor of construct validity, the organizing of mental disorders by statistical 
correlations among symptoms (APA, 2013). All of these criticisms have been ably defended. Good clinical 
reasoning, in my view, will mark a step away from this classificatory scheme. 
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A two-stage picture will be my starting point for what follows. 
 
4. Preview of Primary Chapters 
(2) Culturally Unbound: How Cross-Cultural Cognitive Diversity Affects Methodology in 
Clinical Psychiatry—My first criteria for good clinical reasoning is that it strictly separates 
its descriptive and evaluative projects into two stages, such that notions of typicality do 
not delimit the class of mental disorders. To substantiate this, in this chapter I consider 
how human psychological variation should affect methodology in two-stage psychiatric 
research. I examine recent empirical evidence and develop what I call the Cross-
Cultural Diversity (CCD) picture of the human mind, according to which, variation in 
the underlying causal structure of the human mind implies variation in mental illnesses. 
I then examine the implications of the CCD view for a discipline which tries to separate 
the descriptive from the evaluative in taxonomization of mental disorders, by examining 
one methodological proposal given by philosopher Dominic Murphy in his book 
Psychiatry in the Scientific Image. I argue that, even in an idealized case, Murphy’s 
methodology is hindered by its reliance on a conception of ‘normal human nature’, and 
thus does not adequately accommodate cognitive diversity. Next I sketch a promising 
way to revise Murphy’s proposed methodology, by examining Grant Ramsey’s recent 
work on human nature and his Life-history Trait Cluster (LTC) view. I end with some 
notes on how these considerations are beginning to shape inquiry in the form of the 
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project. 
(3) Individualism as a Solution to Paternalism in Psychiatric Practice—If the goal of 
psychiatric practice is to alleviate the suffering caused by mental illness, what kinds of 
standards are the right ones to use in determining what counts as mental illness? In this 
chapter, I will address the problem of paternalism in psychiatry, the frequent 
occurrence of clinical intervention—including diagnosis itself—on the basis of unjustified 
standards. Following Daniel Groll’s work on paternalism, I will argue that, in face of 
avowals from competent patients that they are not ill, the burden of proof falls on the 
clinician to show that a diagnosis is justified. Further, following Valerie Tiberius and 
Alexandria Plakias’s discussions of well-being, I will argue that a theory with properly 
justified evaluative standards for psychiatric diagnosis must have normative authority. I 
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examine how several theories of mental disorder fail to have normative authority, and 
conclude that clinical psychiatry must ground what it means to be mentally ill or 
mentally healthy in the concerns of individual patients. My second criteria for good 
clinical reasoning, therefore, is that it respect variation in what makes individuals 
flourish by locating mental health in the concerns of individual patients. 
(4) Stewardship of the Mind: How an Ecological Perspective Can Help Us Better 
Understand Psychiatric Therapy—Understanding how therapeutic change occurs in 
clinical psychiatry depends non-trivially on how we understand human cognition and 
human agency. In this chapter I will closely examine what an ecological perspective on 
cognition and agency tells us about what has gone wrong in cases of mental illness, and 
how successful therapeutic interventions generate change. Briefly, an ecological 
perspective casts human beings as stewards of the mind—ecological agents that manage 
cognitive ecology. Manifest variation in individual cognitive ecology, then, implies that 
there will be variation in the ways we achieve, maintain, and improve mental health. 
From this ecological perspective, therapeutic techniques are best conceived of as a 
species of agential technologies; a set of often non-obvious methods and strategies of 
control, whose pathway of influence over behavior and psychological functioning often 
loops outside the boundaries of the skin and skull. My third criteria for good clinical 
reasoning, then, is that it take advantage of the unique insights of an ecological 
perspective that can help teach us how to be better, mentally.
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2. CULTURALLY UNBOUND: 
HOW CROSS-CULTURAL COGNITIVE DIVERSITY AFFECTS 




1. Is Human Nature Messy?  
It is now taken for granted in many circles that substantial psychological variability exists 
across human populations; we don’t merely differ in the ways we behave, but in the ways 
we think, as well. Though versions of this view have been around for some time,
1
 Joe Henrich, Steven Heine, and Ara Norenzayan’s 2010 paper, ‘The Weirdest People in 
the World?’ has had an exciting and catalyzing impact on the field, getting researchers 
involved in discussions of human nature to take cross-cultural cognitive diversity seriously. 
Reviewing a broad selection of comparative studies from across the behavioral sciences, in 
social psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and neuroscience, 
Henrich et al. catalogue substantial evidence of population level psychological variation in 
humans—which is all the more surprising because the database of cross-cultural studies is at 
this point quite narrow. Further, Henrich et al. show that while behavioral scientists rely 
disproportionately on subjects from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic (WEIRD) societies, these WEIRD subjects “are among the least 
representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans” (p. 61, Henrich 
et al., 2010).
                                                            
I would like to thank the members of the Moral Psychology Research Group and the audience at the 2014 
SSPP, as well as Dominic Murphy and Rob Wilson for feedback on earlier presentations of this material. 
1
 Not least since early interest in ‘cultural relativism’ in cultural psychology and anthropology. But here I’m 
thinking of more recent work such as Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd’s views on gene-culture coevolution, 
Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s many contributions to anthropology and social psychology, and Stephen 
Stich’s work on cross cultural differences in philosophical intuition. These are all great examples of this trend 
in the human behavioral sciences, and the effort to get clearer about the nature, scope, and source of human 
psychological variation. For more, see Nisbett & Cohen (1996), Nisbett (2003), Boyd & Richerson (2005), 
and Stich (2010).  
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Clinical psychiatry is just one discipline that has a stake in our evolving 
understanding of psychological variability. What is and isn’t a part of human nature and 
just how much psychological variation is included in our notion of human nature will have 
a significant impact on how we conceive of, investigate, and treat mental disorders. Indeed, 
researchers and clinicians have been grappling with this issue at least since the advent of 
‘cultural psychiatry’ in the early 1960s.
2
 Even so, for much of this time, many empirically oriented philosophers of mind 
thought there to be a fairly large common core of human psychology that was relatively 
stable and invariant across cultures.
3
 This was the dominant view of the mind in the late 
nineties in evolutionary psychology, a picture which has been inherited by many 
contemporary, scientifically minded views of psychiatry. 
In this paper I am interested in how the emerging view of human psychological 
nature, which I’ll call the Cross-Cultural Diversity (CCD) view, should in turn affect clinical 
psychiatry. In particular, I want to begin to think about what the implications are for the 
discipline when we take Henrich at al.’s paradigm of human psychological variation to be 
correct. I will work from Dominic Murphy’s account of scientific psychiatry in his 2006 
book Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, focusing on the methodology he prescribes for 
investigation in psychopathology. I’ve chosen Murphy’s account as my starting place 
because he has done the most to articulate and defend a view shared by philosophers 
interested in scientifically-minded psychiatric research which employs a two-stage 
methodology. I will ask whether Murphy’s account of the two-stage picture has the tools to 
accommodate what we now know about human psychological variation. 
                                                            
2
 Most recently, the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) struck the concept ‘culture bound syndrome’ from its pages in the 5th edition (after it was 
added just one edition before) (APA, 2013). As a project which rejects causal explanation as a way to ground 
mental disorders, talk of culture in the DSM has tended to focus on how human culture shapes the context of 
mental disorders, their expression, and how they may be competently treated. Little attention has been paid 
to the implications of the kind of underlying, cross-cultural cognitive diversity sketched by Henrich et al., just 
as little has been paid to consilience with the other sciences of the mind and brain. 
3
 I’m thinking here of the pervasive influence of the massive modularity hypothesis in the past few decades. 
This line of thought emerged after the publication of philosopher Jerry Fodor’s 1983 book The Modularity 
of Mind made a substantial impact on thinkers in Evolutionary Psychology such as John Tooby and Leda 
Cosmides (1992), Dan Sperber (1994; 2002), and Stephen Pinker (1997). Massive modularity has received its 
most sustained and powerful defense in Peter Carruther’s 2006 book, The Architecture of the Mind. 
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Addressing this question will require elaboration on two points. First, I’ll say more 
about Murphy’s account of the two-stage picture, including a working example of how a 
mental disorder is identified. Second, to develop the CCD view, I will draw a number of 
‘lessons’ from the work of Henrich et al. and other’s interested in cognitive diversity. My 
main contention with Murphy’s account is that it fails to adequately accommodate these 
lessons. Shaping these two pieces will be the work of the remainder of this section, in 1.1 
and 1.2 respectively. 
In section two, I will highlight a particular weakness in Murphy’s account which I’ll 
call the variant mechanisms problem. I will argue that, even in an idealized case, its 
methodology cannot adequately accommodate cognitive diversity, because of its reliance on 
a notion of ‘normal human nature’ which does not square with evidence of psychological 
variation across cultures. As a result of this—even at its most responsible—a program of 
psychiatric research along the lines of Murphy’s account will generate an impoverished 
nosology of mental disorders. Even so, the two-stage picture retains many theoretical and 
methodological virtues over its competitors.
4
 For this reason, I think there is good 
motivation to retool the two-stage picture, rather than give up on it entirely.  
In section three I will consider two strategies for modifying Murphy’s account: 
expanding the notion of human nature at work in the two-stage picture, and rejecting it 
entirely as a guide to what is and isn’t mental a disorder. I argue that the later strategy is the 
preferable option. Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts on how this debate is taking 
shape in current research. 
 
1.1 Murphy's Account 
Murphy conceives of psychopathology, the science of psychiatry that investigates and 
delineates mental disorders, as “the study of failures of normal human nature” (Murphy, p. 
11, 2006). In his book, he is concerned with articulating a view where the notion of mental 
disorder is not grounded in folk conceptions or existing disciplinary conventions, arguing 
that these things can compromise the objectivity of a nosology (Murphy, 2006). Take for 
example the case of drapetomania, as described by the American physician Samuel 
                                                            
4
 For more on this refer to my arguments in the introductory chapter. 
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Cartwright in 1851, a condition that causes black slaves to flee captivity. This powerfully 
illustrates how disciplinary conventions are often fashioned in response to culturally relative 
norms and conventions about what behaviors are and are not desirable, thereby enforcing 
those norms and characterizing individuals as unwell who aren’t. 
As long as the notion of disorder at work in contemporary psychiatry is tangled in 
existing disciplinary conventions such that what Murphy calls ‘norms of human interest’ 
determine the class of mental disorders in advance of scientific investigation, 
psychopathology will not, as the saying goes, cut nature at its joints. To combat this kind of 
pseudoscience, Murphy argues, mental disorders should be understood as real entities with 
discoverable causal etiologies of which it is the purview of the social sciences and the 
sciences of the mind to discover and delineate (2006). This view of mental disorder is 
common among contemporary theorists, and of the sort I am interested in analyzing here.  
The methodology for psychopathology that Murphy describes in his book makes 
room for just this kind of objectivity. Rather than going around looking for people who 
exhibit behaviors which are already considered undesirable and letting this determine what 
mental disorders are, researchers let scientific investigation into human minds lead inquiry 
into the concept of mental disorder. Inquiry literally happens in two stages, the first 
descriptive, and the second evaluative. This way, “classification of mental illness [groups] 
symptoms into conditions based on the causal structure of the abnormal mind” (Murphy, 
p. 11, 2006). On Murphy’s picture, mental disorders are to be grounded in objective facts 
about the individuals they characterize, including both sociocultural facts and facts that 
make recourse to underlying neuropathology.  
Ideally, the two stages mediate a realm of positive fact within which science 
operates, and a separate but equally real realm of moral and social evaluation within which 
conceptions of human flourishing have a home. This keeps the sciences “at a distance from 
the various non-scientific projects we otherwise wish to engage in”, and allows us to resist 
the worry that clinical psychiatry is in the business of enforcing culturally relative behavioral 
norms under the guise of objective scientific practice (Murphy, p. 103, 2006). At the same 
time, because our evaluative concepts still play a role, the cognitive and neurosciences do 
not have the final say in how we think of mental disorder in practical and social arenas. 
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According to Murphy, the ideal two-stage methodology should work in the 
following way: First, researchers identify and taxonomize cognitive breakdowns that prevent 
individuals from being within the ‘normal range’ of function for a particular cognitive 
mechanism (Murphy, 2006). That is, they search for psychological conditions manifesting 
patterns that are atypical with respect to how one or more pieces of cognitive architecture 
functions for human beings. They then hand over this objective menu of conditions to 
various therapists, lawyers, social workers, and ethicists who refer to it in the course of their 
respective normatively informed projects. This second group of researchers supplies some 
normative considerations in order to decide which breakdowns count as mental disorders 
and belong in the nosology.
5
 In this way, norms of human interest do not determine the 
class of mental disorders in advance—as a result of which, drapetomania would never enter 
Murphy’s nosology, as it refers to a set of behaviors irrespective of any underlying objective 
entity investigable by the sciences. Notice also, that the resulting nosology is not governed 
by uniquely neuroscientific considerations. The classic example, a condition called 
gourmand’s syndrome which causes ‘excessive’ interest in fine dining, may be interesting 
because its underlying cause is a brain lesion, but it is unclear whether it should be 
considered a mental disorder.  
Murphy considers scientific investigation into mental breakdowns to be a non-
normative enterprise, or at least normative in a ‘weak and unproblematic’ sense, as it does 
not appeal to norms of human interest (Murphy, 2006). The sense of normativity here is 
statistical, revealing ‘natural norms’ rather than evaluative or justificatory norms of human 
interest. Murphy expects that for each cognitive mechanism there will be some 
generalization about the role it tends to play in a larger system, and that role will determine 
the natural boundaries within which that mechanism ought to operate. Says Murphy, “[m]y 
hope is that a combination of causal and statistical reasoning can go some way toward 
settling where the boundaries are” (Murphy, p. 349, 2006).  
                                                            
5
 In the service of keeping the two stages separate I am going to use these terms in a strict manner, with 
‘mental disorder’ and ‘nosology’ referring to the output at stage two, and ‘norms of human interest’ to the 
cultural conventions and theoretic commitments of stage two’s evaluative project. ‘Breakdown’, ‘taxonomy’, 
and ‘naturalized norms’ will refer exclusively to the output and concepts in stage one. This should align with 
usages in rest of my project. Murphy is not careful about these distinctions, as his project is very much 
focused on stage one, and issues in the philosophy of science such as the ontological status of mental 
disorders and what explanatory role they play.  
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Murphy is generally optimistic about the mechanistic tractability of human 
psychology and the success of further research in the cognitive sciences. Sharing this 
optimism—by taking on the assumption that human psychology is for the most part 
mechanistically tractable, and that research in the sciences of the mind will be productive 
and informative—is the main respect in which I’m considering an idealized version of 
Murphy’s program.6 
To make this a bit more concrete, consider how a diagnosis like Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) would enter the nosology of mental disorders on 
Murphy’s account. First, researchers pick out an individual who exhibits noteworthy 
behavioral, biological, or neurological symptoms, say, little Calvin from Bill Watterson’s 
Calvin and Hobbes. Calvin serves as an exemplar. At stage one, scientists discover the 
causal etiology of these symptoms and trace them to the underlying structure which is their 
cause. In other words, they do cognitive neuroscience. Perhaps in Calvin’s case, they 
identify mechanism A, which is responsible for managing attention. If this underlying 
structure is mechanistically tractable, and if it is a shared aspect of human psychology (a 
part of human nature), and if that mechanism is functioning abnormally (outside of its 
normal range), then a breakdown has been identified in Calvin. Finally, the researchers 
build a model of this breakdown, generalizing from the features of Calvin which cause the 
abnormal function, and add it to the taxonomy of breakdowns. Notice that every step 
described so far takes place in stage one. Indeed, it is unknown whether ADHD is a 
mental disorder until further normative input is supplied from stage two.
7
 
In order to be successful, Murphy’s account will need a principled way to capture 
the panoply of illnesses that cause human beings to suffer, and this reveals an unanswered 
question about how stage one researchers should proceed. We may grant that some 
combination of causal and statistical reasoning will show when a particular cognitive 
mechanism is functioning in an atypical way, but which atypicalities in human psychology 
are interesting from the perspective of psychiatric research, and which mechanisms are 
                                                            
6
 Of course, this idealization overlooks the possibility that much of our cognition may not be decomposable 
into discrete mechanisms in the way Murphy’s theory would require. Murphy recognizes this possibility, and 
dismisses it with the quip ‘human nature is messy’ (Murphy, 2006). 
7
 Because he is mainly interested in stage one, the normative stage of determining what counts as a mental 
disorder is largely ignored in Murphy’s book, to the detriment of the theory. It remains to us to think critically 
about the second stage, and how the two stages of scientific psychiatry are supposed to interact. 
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parts of human nature? For Murphy’s account to work, researchers will need to know, at 
stage one, certain facts about mechanisms of attention, and mechanism A in particular. 
Namely, is mechanism A shared or common to most humans across different 
demographics? Is mechanism A, the way it functions in Calvin, a part of human nature? 
It is quite clear that Murphy’s project depends on there being some empirically 
useful notion of human nature, but less clear what notion he’s relying on in Psychiatry and 
the Scientific Image. His talk of ‘normal human nature’ is vague at least partially because he 
is not concerned with giving an account of human nature in his book. Whatever the details 
of the right account of human nature are, Murphy seems to think they can be worked out 
elsewhere, arguing that, “[i]t is quite correct that we will not be able to explain everything 
about people without using culturally specific, and indeed biographically specific, 
information. But that does not mean that no interesting generalizations can be formed that 
cross cultures” (Murphy, p. 148, 2006).  
That there are at least some cross-cultural generalizations to be made about human 
psychology which are of interest from the standpoint of psychiatry seems likely. Whether 
these generalizations will allow us to demarcate clear disease categories is another matter. I 
agree with Murphy that it is too soon to give up on a science of human psychological 
nature, and will have more to say soon about what I think that science might look like, but 
for now it is interesting to note a few details about how Murphy himself is conceiving of the 
subject. First, he relies heavily on the term ‘generalization.’ Second, crucially, because the 
sense of ‘abnormality’ in stage one is statistical, without input from stage two, the most we 
can say about a breakdown is that it rises to the level of interest necessary for being 
considered as a mental disorder. On Murphy’s picture, there is nothing evaluatively 
normative about exhibiting or not exhibiting a breakdown. 
Human nature, for Murphy, functions as a statistical standard for identifying 
breakdowns. If ADHD is modeled as a breakdown, it will only be if mechanism A is in fact 
a part of human nature. The normal distribution curve that describes how mechanism A 
usually functions gives us a guide for forming a generalization that can be said to be a part 
of human nature, such as ‘mechanism A manages attention in humans in such and such a 
way’. When an individual falls on the tail-end of that curve—or when their cognitive 
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mechanism is operating outside of its normal functional range—they can be said to exhibit a 
failure of normal human nature in virtue of statistical abnormality. 
There are two important features of human nature, then, that Murphy’s picture 
requires. First, non-essentialism; properties which are parts of human nature should be 
described by true generalizations.
8
 Second, non-normativity; these generalizations should 
not describe necessary and sufficient conditions for being included as a member of the 
human species. To my mind, there are two good candidates of naturalistic interpretations 
of human nature which have arisen in recent debate that might fit these criteria, Edouard 
Machery’s (2008) nomological notion of human nature, and Richard Samuels’ 
Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of human nature (2012).
9
 
Consider first Machery’s nomological notion. The nomological notion is a 
scientifically useful notion which acknowledges and accommodates our manifest variability 
and adaptive plasticity, by denying that the properties that make up human nature are 
strictly universal, and that there is anything right or wrong in having them (Cashdan, 2013; 
Machery, 2008). According to Machery, “human nature is the set of properties that 
humans tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their species … the fact that many 
generalizations can be made about humans explains in which sense there is a human 
nature” (Machery, p. 232, 2008). On this way of thinking, walking on two legs is a part of 
human nature. On the HPC account, by contrast, human nature consists of the cluster of 
causal properties or mechanisms which explain “[t]he more readily observable, reliably 
occurring generalizations that hold of human beings” (p. 25, 2012). Whatever set of 
biological mechanisms that explains why a generalization like ‘humans walk on two legs’ is 
true, is a part of human nature on Samuels’ view. 
The nomological notion and the HPC account both meet the criteria of non-
essentialism. Indeed, both views were designed in response to empirical problems with 
essentialist accounts of human nature. But they differ with respect to the second criteria of 
non-normativity. To see why, consider Olympic sprint runner Oscar Pistorius, whose legs 
                                                            
8
 In this sense, ‘humans walk on two legs’ is a true generalization about humans. Walking on two legs is a 
property that most (not all) humans share. This should rule out Sarah Jane Leslie-style striking property 
generics like ‘birds lay eggs’ since of course, this is true of less than half of birds (for more see: Leslie, 2007).  
9
 In fact, Samuels account has been taken up in a theory of psychiatric kinds recently developed by Kenneth 
Kendler, Peter Zachar, and Carl Craver (2011).  
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were amputated below the knee when he was eleven months old. Both the nomological 
notion and the HPC account grant that, despite not having two legs in the usual sense, 
Oscar is indeed a member of the human species. Neither is in the business of giving 
necessary or sufficient conditions for being human. However because Oscar does not 
possess the mechanism that makes ‘humans walk on two legs’ true, Samuels must conclude 
that there is something abnormal about Oscar. The HPC account implies that there is 
something wrong with Oscar in virtue of his not having legs (Samuels, 2012). There is no 
such implication for the nomological notion, as whether or not a particular individual 
possesses a property of human nature is of no consequence. As Machery describes it, 
“human nature is not normative. There is nothing wrong in not having the properties that 
are part of human nature” (Machery, p. 324, 2008). To my mind therefore, nomological 
notion provides the most charitable interpretation of Murphy’s usage of ‘normal human 
nature’ in his book. It will be helpful to keep this in mind as I describe the Cross-Cultural 
Diversity view of human psychological nature in the next part of this section. 
 
1.2 Lessons of Cognitive Diversity 
A picture is beginning to emerge from recent empirical evidence that, to the extent there is 
a core of human psychological nature, this core is much smaller than was thought even 
fifteen years ago. Today, in the work of Henrich et al. and others, much more emphasis is 
put on the environment, culture, and cultural variation, than is put on innateness and 
invariance. The following four ‘lessons’ I’ve drawn from Henrich et al.’s work typify a 
recent trend of research sensitive to diversity in human cognition. They bear directly on 
current thinking about human nature, and are the kinds of claims which any view that 
aspires to take cognitive diversity seriously ought to be able to accommodate. 
 
(1) There is an astounding amount of population level variation—Comparative studies in 
social psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and neuroscience 
have revealed evidence of population level variation in self-concepts, norms of fairness 
and cooperation, folk-biological reasoning, spatial reasoning, representing integer 





 motor development (Karasik et al., 2010), philosophic intuition (Stich, 1998; 
2010), physiological response to insult (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), susceptibility to biases 
such as self-serving and self-effacing biases, situation and attention biases, and hindsight 
biases (Nisbett, 2003), as a partial list. 
(2) Much is likely due to variability in contingent, social and ecological conditions rather 
than genetic variability—While Henrich et al. cite many possible explanations for the 
existence of population level variation (Henrich, 2010), the growing consensus seems to 
be that our behavioral variation is for the most part traceable to our uniquely human 
adaptive plasticity (Panchanathan, 2010). There are two main ways of understanding 
what this adaptive plasticity amounts to. In the tradition of Peter Richerson and Robert 
Boyd’s work on cultural evolution, human beings may have evolved “[n]umerous 
domain-specific mechanisms that are designed to interact with the cultural, social, and 
ecological environment to produce locally adaptive phenotypes” (Henrich et al., p. 102, 
2010; see also: Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Machery, 2010; Fessler & Machery, 2012). 
This view has much in common with the nativist and modularity hypotheses in the 
philosophy of mind (see: Carruthers, 2006). An opposing, but not strictly incompatible 
thesis in the tradition of Kim Sterelny’s work on ecological niche construction posits 
that our cognitive architecture is for the most part constituted by domain-general 
mechanisms which allow us to absorb, through learning and cultural transmission, 
vastly different psychological processes, traits, or capacities (Sterelny, 2003; 2012; 
Machery, 2010). Each explanatory model seems to agree that we are comprised of 
some combination of domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms; the points of 
contention are rather how much of our cognition is innate and how much is learned, 
and how much is domain-general or domain-specific. No matter how this score is 
settled, the common point is that differing environments can cause vastly different 
developmental trajectories.
11
 Each rejects what Rob Wilson calls the External 
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 For a fuller bibliographic listing of the relevant studies see Henrich et al. (2010). 
11
 If the point here was simply that our external environments play a role in development and shaping our 
psychologies, it would be rather trivial. But these lessons present a methodological problem for research in 
the human behavioral sciences, especially when evaluative concepts come into play!  
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Minimalism Thesis, that “[s]tructures and processes external to an individual play at 
best a secondary causal role in…development” (p. 15, 2004).12 
(3) The prevalence of variation is reflective of differing minds—The diversity in question 
here is cognitive diversity. Whether caused by domain-general mechanisms or domain-
specific mechanisms, genuine underlying psychological differences across populations 
explain the prevalence of behavioral variation. Put another way, human adults from 
different cultures and environments have different minds. Humans don’t just act 
differently, we think differently, too. This is quite significant, though what effect it will 
have for psychiatric diagnosis depends on how much of the variation each explanatory 
model accounts for. Whatever the case, our shared psychological endowment is 
certainly less substantial than has traditionally been assumed by behavioral scientists.  
(4) It is difficult to disentangle innately shared aspects of human psychology from 
developmentally, culturally, or environmentally contingent aspects
13—Because of our 
adaptive and developmental plasticity, and because of the variance among our cognitive 
mechanisms, there is a methodological difficulty for human behavioral research. It is 
hard to find data that show that a particular behavior found in a particular population 
can be found across populations. It is even harder to discover what mechanism drives 
that behavior, whether that mechanism is common to all humans, and whether it 
operates in reliably similar ways across contexts. All these things matter when 
determining truths about the human mind. Yet despite the narrow sample size, and the 
status of WEIRD subjects as outliers, “behavioral scientists are often interested in 
drawing inferences [from WEIRD populations] about the human mind and human 
behavior… This lack of epistemic vigilance underscores the prevalent, though implicit 
assumption that the findings one derives from a particular sample will generalize 
broadly” (Henrich et al., p. 63, 2010; italics in original). 
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 For more on the relationship between nativism and modularity across the sciences, see Wilson’s 
Boundaries of the Mind (2004). 
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2. The Variant Mechanisms Problem 
My objection to the methodology that Murphy outlines is that its reliance on ‘normal 
human nature’ does not adequately address the facts described by Henrich et al.’s lessons. 
The best way to understand the variant mechanisms problem may be to first outline an 
objection against Murphy that I think fails to get off the ground.  
 
2.1 Rejecting the Exemplar Objection 
Symptoms of mental illness are one type of behavior which we should expect to exhibit 
population level variation, and we do not in general expect that all of our psychiatric 
categories will be universally applicable. Considering this might lead one to worry that the 
real problem with Murphy’s view is the very process by which psychiatric diagnoses enter 
the nosology; that scientific psychiatry’s methodology biases psychiatric theory building in 
unacceptable ways, because it proceeds by relying on exemplars of this or that failure of a 
cognitive mechanism to populate the list of mental breakdowns that make up our 
taxonomy. Call this the exemplar objection.  
The exemplar objection notes that on Murphy’s picture, if a disorder has been 
successfully modeled, then the underlying computational structure it is based in is, by fiat, 
common to most humans. In actual practice, Western researchers tend to look only into 
exemplars and conditions that are salient to them. Other times, budget considerations limit 
research to subjects that are practically within reach. Western researchers are therefore 
liable to leave out interesting conditions more common in non-WEIRD populations, and 
may even fail to model some prevalent abnormalities in their own niches. This turns the 
use of exemplars to guide inquiry into a biasing mechanism. For contingent, and perhaps 
ethnocentric reasons, given that the discipline of psychiatry as we know it is mainly a 
Western enterprise, we may expect the resulting taxonomy to be incomplete—so says the 
exemplar objection. 
As Henrich et al. are at pains to point out, this has been a methodological problem 
with research in the human sciences all along. With contemporary research in 
psychopathology in particular, we have no reason to think that the exemplars we are 
familiar with completely represent the ways in which humans might break down. Instead, 
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the taxonomy is likely reflective of conditions that afflict our WEIRD exemplars. Those 
belonging to the cultural psychiatry movement have often made this complaint about the 
DSM in particular. While a few non-WEIRD mental illnesses have caught Westerner’s 
attention, such as the startle matching syndrome known as latah in Southeast Asia and 
other members of the former ‘culture bound syndrome’ category, it is possible that the 




The exemplar objection is not a fair criticism of the two-stage view. It fails because 
it is unwarranted to saddle an idealization of two-stage methodology with concerns about 
psychiatry as it’s currently practiced. A responsible stage one researcher who takes the first 
of Henrich et al.’s lessons seriously would make an effort to conduct a great deal of cross-
cultural research, and generate a more representative collection of models.  
 
2.2 Variant Mechanisms Impoverish the Nosology on Murphy’s Account 
Even if we imagine a world in which a smart and responsible group of super-scientists had 
unlimited resources at their disposal in order to implement Murphy’s program, there 
would still be two very important complications. First, as demonstrated by the fourth 
lesson, we have no way of knowing a priori whether the structures that underlie WEIRD 
behavioral variants are shared or instantiated in other cultures.
15
 Upon investigation, 
sometimes they’ll be shared, and sometimes they won’t. In other words, the question of 
whether some exemplary behavioral variant really is evidence of a breakdown cannot be 
settled in advance of the research. 
Second, and more importantly, if Henrich et al.’s third lesson is right and it is our 
minds themselves and not just our behaviors which differ cross-culturally, we should expect 
a ‘rich diversity of functional modes’ when it comes to our cognitive mechanisms—different 
minds, different mechanisms (Amundson, 1999). And if we really do vary with respect to 
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 Indeed, as cross-cultural research is starting to get more attention (and more resources thanks to efforts like 
the Intellectual Humility Project (2013)), the situational embeddedness of symptoms of mental illness 
becomes more and more apparent. There is now good evidence to think that hallucinatory voices are shaped 
by culture both geographically (Parker, 2014) and across time (Jay, 2013). 
15
 This may be true of many diagnoses currently deemed widely applicable by the DSM. In many of these 
cases, we don’t even know what the underlying structures are. 
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our cognitive machinery, then we should expect that the ways in which things go wrong will 
vary across populations as well. We should find not just that the way failures of cognitive 
mechanisms are expressed in behavior changes from culture to culture, but that the 
mechanisms themselves, and therefore the failures, change. Variance in the underlying 
causal structure of the human mind implies variance in illnesses. This is the upshot of the 
CCD view. Much of the cognitive structure in which characteristically ‘disordered’ behavior 
is grounded is liable to be built by culture, or learned from the environment. Thus the 
mechanisms in question will vary across ecological niche, and there will be no appropriate 
generalizations about them from the perspective of scientific psychiatry.  
That there is no way of accommodating this kind of variation on Murphy’s picture 
is the basis of the variant mechanisms problem. Because the only conditions that rise to the 
level of interest from the standpoint of psychiatry on his construal are those that are 
common across cultures—or part of human nature—mechanisms that are not shared are not 
eligible to be modeled as breakdowns. Consider for example, the recent mass psychosis 
occurring in the village of Kalachi in Kazakhstan, causing almost ten percent of the 
population to fall asleep (Hay, 2014). If the underlying cause of this behavior is not a part 
of human nature, do these villagers not count as sick? This strikes me as a way of 
overpopulating the list of mere ‘problems in living’ and impoverishing our taxonomy, 
which is especially problematic from the perspective of a clinician who relies on diagnostic 
categories to secure treatment. 
When it turns out that the structures picked out in exemplars like Calvin aren’t 
shared what should be done? Suppose, as is not unlikely, that mechanism A, which 
underlies Calvin’s ADHD, is not widely instantiated across cultures because our ways of 
managing attention are culturally learned.
16
 Perhaps A is the result of a domain-general 
mechanism and develops in some niches, but not others, or perhaps it is a domain-specific 
mechanism that develops vastly different tendencies in different niches.
17
 If we ask, has 
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 Indeed, there is a suggestive correlation between high rates of ADHD diagnoses and state laws that penalize 
schools when they fail to meet the standards set by No Child Left Behind (Miller, 2014). 
17
 These are two different ways of parsing what ‘shared’ might mean, according to the two explanatory models 
outlined earlier. Importantly, both are abhorrent to Murphy’s view, as they severely limit the number of 
generalizations that can be drawn about most humans. My sympathies lie with the anti-nativist and anti-
modularity hypotheses of Sterelny’s view, according to which a good deal of humans’ information processing 
structure is not innate and in the head, but external and in the cultural niche. This is important because the 
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something gone wrong here? Murphy must reply no. There is no true generalization that 
can be made about how this mechanism tends to function in most humans. And the same 
goes for any other cognitive mechanism which is unevenly distributed across human 
populations, of which there are liable to be many.
 18
 On his account, these simply won’t 
enter the nosology. 
The way Murphy has framed it, nothing about any differentially distributed 
psychological entity rises to the level of interest necessary for being a mental disorder. The 
notion of normal human nature that he relies on generates a taxonomy of breakdowns that 
does not adequately accommodate cross-cultural cognitive diversity because it does not 
fully capture what is interesting about the way human minds fail. In the hypothetical 
ADHD case, the problem Calvin has still seems very much rooted in the malfunction of a 
psychological entity. Murphy’s picture, however, is only interested in those mechanisms we 
share, and not fully sensitive to the ways we differ. 
 
3. Saving the Two Stages 
In which direction do we proceed? What if a taxonomy of breakdowns as composed by 
Murphy’s stage one does not capture everything that is interesting about the way human 
minds fail? Put another way, what will it take to consider people suffering with symptoms of 
ADHD or latah or any other condition to be candidates for disorder without recourse to 
norms of human interest? Because if the story told by Henrich et al. is right, humans have 
far less in common psychologically than Murphy is likely to need to get his project off the 
ground. Can the two-stage view be modified so as to retain the virtues mentioned above, 
and still capture what is interesting about the many ways in which human minds can fail?  
I hope you share the intuition that the kind of response given by Murphy in the 
hypothetical ADHD case is suspect, and not just because we have an interest in patients’ 
welfare. If you are motivated by this problem, a dilemma seems to emerge: either rethink 
human nature, or rethink the two-stage view. Next in 3.1 I will consider the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
problem here may be seen as much worse if it turns out that there is not much at all which is stable or 
generalizable about human psychological nature 
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modifying the notion of normal human nature on Murphy’s account. I end up rejecting this 
move because it will actually make accommodating the suffering caused by mental illness 
even more difficult. In 3.2 I consider the possibility of modifying the two-stage view. 
 
3.1 The First Horn: Expanding Human Nature 
After considering the manifest psychological variation revealed by the CCD picture, one 
might be tempted to think something like the following: if we really do have different minds 
we should expect that we break down in different ways as well. There should be ways of 
specifying failures in contingent aspects of human psychology, which are candidates for a 
psychiatric nosology, on any adequate account. Is there, then, another way of thinking 
about human nature, compatible with the CCD picture, which psychiatry might rely on?  
At one point in his book, Murphy suggests that it may be acceptable to sort people 
into classes, and specify a range of normal properties for each class. For example, the eyes 
of babies, elderly people, and adults have different functional tendencies, and expectations 
for what is statistically normal reflect this fact (Murphy, 2006). If the nomological notion of 
human nature is expanded to include properties that belong to some subsets of humans, it 
would grant researchers the ability to specify failures in contingent aspects of human 
psychology in a natural way. For instance, we would be able to narrow the domain for our 
generalization about Calvin’s mechanism A, perhaps specifying that it tends to develop a 
certain way in the East and another way in the West. Using this modified notion, if Calvin’s 
mechanism A is statistically abnormal with respect to the normal functional range for 
Westerners, then it is evidence of a breakdown.  
Whether this is an acceptable move in part depends on whether relativized 
properties are proper parts of nomological human nature. Machery himself emphatically 
argues that they are not. In a 2012 response to Tim Lewens, Machery defends what he calls 
the universality proposal, his claim that only those generalizations that hold for most 
humans are properties of human nature. If we relax this proposal and include properties 
relativized across age groups or biological sexes, he reasons, then why not include 
properties relativized across small subcultures or kin groups? Machery argues that the 
resulting notion is absurdly arbitrary since it is too inclusive (Machery, 2012). 
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I will have more to say on what makes a notion of human nature scientifically useful 
in the next section. Regardless, it is clear that rejecting the universality proposal will have 
disastrous consequences for a two-stage methodology as Murphy has outlined it. 
Remember that Murphy’s original motivation for using a notion of human nature to 
determine what counts as a breakdown in stage one was to prevent pseudoscientific 
diagnoses like drapetomania from entering the nosology (Murphy, 2006). This is still vitally 
important. 
Suppose that you are handed a culturally relativized taxonomy of breakdowns and 
asked which count as mental disorders. What reason would there be for claiming, in an 
evaluative sense, that Japanese people ought to think Japanese and Paraguayan people 
ought to think Paraguayan?! If we make the move from thinking that it is statistically 
abnormal for people raised in a certain cultural context to have certain cognitive 
mechanisms, to thinking that it is necessarily disordered for them to have those 
mechanisms, the ugly specter of paternalism rises, such that psychiatric diagnoses are made 
based on unjustified evaluative standards. Imagine other explanations of this form—your 
mind should be shaped this way because you’re a woman, because you grew up poor, etc. 
Quite plausibly, no relativized breakdowns would ever go on to be considered disordered 
at stage two. This supposed fix for scientific psychiatry has actually made Murphy’s 
problem worse, and for these reasons the first horn of our dilemma should be ruled out. 
Before moving to the second horn of the dilemma, I would like to consider one 
further objection. Namely, that one way to avoid the difficulties I have proposed is by 
denying that they are there. It might be argued that, despite our manifest psychological 
diversity, the generalizations that can be drawn are enough for Murphy’s program to 
capture what is interesting about mental illness. In order for this to work, when there is 
evidence of cross-cultural variation, researchers must abstract away from those differences 
in order to make an appropriate generalization which is a property of normal human 
nature. So for example, if we do not all share the same visual system, then researchers 
abstract away from the properties of those systems that make us differ until it can be said 
that we do. If moving up a level of abstraction is not possible, researchers might instead 
identify the shared developmental mechanism responsible for the phenotype in question. 
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So though we may have wildly different, culturally transmitted mechanisms managing 
attention, we may have a shared mechanism for acquiring them.
19
 
Perhaps, so described, these mechanisms will be operating outside of their normal 
range in our exemplars, and perhaps not. Of course, this is an empirical question. But I 
would like to sound a note of caution—for both of these strategies, loss of detail makes it 
more likely that the appropriately specified psychological system is functioning within its 
normal range in our exemplars.
20
 Further, my worry about relativized properties still applies 
here. Claiming that it is a part of human nature for a developmental mechanism to produce 
several different functional attention systems in different environments does not answer the 
question of whether Calvin’s behavior is causing him harm.  
 
3.2 The Second Horn: Rejecting the Search for ‘Breakdowns’ 
Before suggesting how the two-stage view might be modified, I want to stress that it need 
not (indeed, ought not) be rejected entirely by, for example, building a normative theory 
for what counts as disorder into the science of psychopathology, or rejecting the idea that 
there are such things as mental disorders altogether. Though this is not the place to fully 
defend the two-stage view of clinical psychiatry, it is worth recalling some of its virtues: 
realism about mental disorders, a scientifically reputable methodology, and its use as a 
critical tool to keep paternalistic diagnoses like drapetomania out of a nosology of mental 
disorders. Separating psychiatry’s descriptive and evaluative projects is both an empirical 
benefit and a defense against the pernicious influence of norms of human interest. 
Of course, one precondition for the practicality of the separation of fact and value 
the way Murphy would have it is the ‘common core’ picture of the mind that he inherited. 
In defending his account, especially his use of normal human nature to ground failures in 
cognitive mechanisms, there is an underlying assumption that stage one researchers can get 
a lot of work done in the lab before allowing norms of human interest to enter the picture. 
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 Many thanks to Eli Shupe for interesting and fruitful discussion on this point. 
20
 I think part of the temptation of this view comes from the apparent success of pharmaceutical tools to 
mitigate psychiatric problems. I am not denying that psychoactive drugs can be good clinical solutions, but 
these chemicals (antidepressants, stimulants, antipsychotics, mood stabilizers etc.) solve both very general 
problems and a very diverse set of problems. In many cases, in current practice, it is like using a 
sledgehammer where a scalpel will do, neatly stepping around the question of which diagnoses necessarily 
applies to the patient. 
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Because the core of human psychological nature is large enough, the thinking goes, fact 
and value can be separated such that researchers will not have to prejudge which 
‘malfunctions’ or ‘failures’ in human psychological nature are mental disorders, and which 
are not. As I have argued, this will simply not be possible if the CCD picture is right, 
because much of what is interesting for clinical psychiatry falls outside the boundaries of 
the common core.  
My suggestion is as follows: to achieve strict separation of psychiatry’s descriptive 
and normative projects, stage one researchers should simply catalogue human cognitive 
mechanisms, to what extent they are universal or culturally acquired, how they operate, and 
under what conditions. One immediate worry is methodological. Perhaps a taxonomy of 
this kind will somehow not be ‘enough’ for a normative theory of mental disorder at stage 
two to work with. This worry strikes me as unwarranted. I believe that the two-stage view’s 
difficulties with cross-cultural cognitive diversity can be solved by thinking critically about 
how the two stages are supposed to interact. On my view, the second stage of clinical 
psychiatry does not require a taxonomy of breakdowns from the first stage.  
If this new methodology can be vindicated, it will provide theorists and clinicians 
two great advantages. First, what is and is not true of most human beings need not have an 
influence on a stage one research program. Instead of worrying about where to draw the 
line between normal and abnormal, stage one researchers can draw bell curves and 
population frequencies without making assumptions about what we should expect to find in 
any one individual’s head—in virtue of their being human, or for that matter from Chicago’s 
south side. Second, by reinforcing a strict boundary between the descriptive and evaluative 
in two-stage psychiatry, we may reexamine whether and how a concept of human nature is 
useful in thinking about mental disorder. Even if it cannot differentiate mental illness from 
mental health, statistical atypicality could provide us with other kinds of information from 
the perspective of clinical psychiatry. 
There are two tasks left ahead, then: to show that a stage one that does not 
delineate breakdowns is methodologically sufficient for a two-stage program, and to 
elaborate on how facts about human variation are useful for the discipline. Happily, the 
second task may shed light on the first. In the remainder of this section, I will return to the 
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question of Machery’s universality proposal, examine its implications for defining the target 
of scientific research. 
 
3.2.1 The Life-History Trait Cluster View 
In a recent paper, Grant Ramsey identifies three desiderata for a non-essentialist notion of 
human nature. He argues that the concept should,  
 
(D1) be the empirically accessible (and thus not based on occult essences) subject of the 
human (psychological, anthropological, economic, biological, etc.) sciences,  
(D2) help clarify related concepts like innateness and naturalness, which are associated with 
human nature, and  
(D3) characterize human uniqueness (Ramsey, 2014). 
 
According to Ramsey’s view, which he formulates as a direct competitor to Machery’s 
nomological notion, the human sciences ought to investigate associations between 
antecedent and consequent traits among all possible human life histories. The statistical 
trends we uncover are properties of human nature on this view, which he calls the Life-
history Trait Cluster (LTC) account. 
The LTC notion of human nature construes what it means to ‘behave naturally’ in 
a relative way, where “[i]nstead of saying that it is natural to C, we should instead say that it 
is natural for As to C where ‘A’ denotes the antecedent(s) and ‘C’ denotes the consequent” 
(Ramsey, p. 990, 2014). For example, ‘lactation in females is a part of human nature’ would 
be an appropriate claim on the LTC account, relating the antecedent trait ‘being female’ to 
the consequent trait ‘lactation’. Says Ramsey, “[i]f there is to be an empirically-accessible 
human nature that sheds troubling essentialisms, then it should be founded on the unique 
pattern of traits within the collective human life histories” (Ramsey, p. 992, 2014). 
Ramsey is quick to note that the LTC account’s embrace of diversity and rejection 
of the universality proposal has one counterintuitive consequence, namely that it is as 
Machery would fear: incredibly inclusive. He counters that, although it is not unique to 
humans, female lactation is surely an important aspect of the human species. Indeed, there 
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are countless more trivial associations which are parts of human nature on the LTC 
account (for instance between having mass and eventually dying). Ramsey accepts the 
inclusion of trivialities, noting that the “[i]nteresting [associations] often occur when the 
antecedent is not universal, and when changes in the antecedent are causally associated with 
changes in the consequent”, and order to narrow the focus, he defines uniquely human 
nature as “the subset of the antecedent-consequent associations that are unique to the 
human species” (Ramsey, p. 992, 2014). 
On one reading, Machery's concern over a notion of human nature like the one 
provided by the LTC account is methodological, questioning whether Ramsey’s account 
can satisfy D1. Think of all the associations which are unique to humans because the 
antecedent is especially restrictive. If human nature is exactly how humans are, however 
they are the thought goes, will it be a useful concept for scientific research? Ramsey 
counters that it is actually the nomological notion of human nature which fails to meet D1 
as a result of its adherence to the universality proposal, questioning why we should assume 
that it is “sameness across individuals that is of interest to scientists, and not their 
variation?” (Ramsey, p. 986, 2014). I am in agreement with Ramsey that human diversity is 
of crucial scientific interest. Indeed it appears that the seemingly arbitrary mess of 
associations that the LTC account identifies is just what the human sciences are 
investigating, whether or not the subset that applies universally is of special interest. 
On another reading, however, Machery’s concern represents a terminological 
disagreement, as in that’s just not what is meant by human nature. I am not much 
interested in settling the terminological dispute. What is crucial to recognize here is that 
what is universal does not determine what is interesting from the perspective of clinical 
psychiatry, so if Machery is right, then human nature is a concept of limited use in thinking 
about mental disorder. In fact, as a purely descriptive catalog of trait frequencies in the 
human population, the LTC account could be useful for psychiatric diagnosis in particular, 
shedding the need to identify breakdowns, and leaving space for stage two to contribute the 
evaluative work. Therefore, since both Machery and Ramsey make clear that their notions 
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are empirically accessible subjects, we may proceed by thinking of Ramsey’s LTC view as 
an account of human diversity, rather than of human nature.
21
  
What is most intriguing about the LTC view and its rejection of the universality 
proposal is the possibility that the conditional schema that Ramsey gives may be mapped 
onto distinction between symptoms and underlying causes. It is very likely that what we 
now call depression, for example, admits of many, causally heterogeneous explanations 
which may be more usefully conceived of as separate diagnoses. Understanding the set of 
antecedent traits that result in certain symptoms is needed to make more accurate 
diagnoses.  
A taxonomy of the many and varied components of the mind will also be crucial 
for understanding what causal pathways may best ameliorate symptoms for any particular 
subject. Whether or not an individual fits a diagnostic category is a different question from 
what therapeutic process is most appropriate for that subject, and locally specific 
information provided by the LTC account will be central to discovering this. Locally 
specific information may also help us make sense of culturally bound syndromes like latah 
and ADHD. 
 
3.2.2 The LTC and the RDoC 
It may not take much imagination to begin to mold the discipline of psychiatry towards a 
two-stage project like the one I have outlined above. The National Institutes of Mental 
Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) matrix has much in common with the kind of 
purely descriptive taxonomy of cognitive mechanisms which I am envisioning as the ideal 
output of stage one. Instead of being organized around current diagnostic categories, the 
RDoC is organized according to our best research programs in the sciences of the mind 
and brain. Research categories often take the form of symptoms such as ‘hearing voices’ or 
capacities such as ‘self-knowledge’. It is intended “as a framework to guide classification of 
patients for research studies, not as an immediately useful clinical tool” (NIMH, 2015). 
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 Surely Ramsey and his supporters will reject this move, but while it’s clear to me that human variation is 
critical to our understanding of ourselves, there is more to be said to support the idea that ‘human nature’ is 
the rightful name for either view. 
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Perhaps forming a list of diagnostic categories is an implicit goal of psychiatric 
research. Murphy and others reject the idea that diagnostic categories can be delimited by 
clusters of symptoms as is done with the DSM. I quite agree. Murphy’s search for 
breakdowns, then, is motivated by the hope that clear disease categories will fall out of the 
search for causal mechanisms. But we have been given no reason thus far to think that this 
might be the case, nor that it need be the case—even without the issue of cross-cultural 
diversity to contend with. In fact, the assumption that clear disease categories will result 
from the search for causal mechanisms is now being questioned by philosophers of 
psychiatry. As Kari Theurer and Daniel Hartner note in a recent project, it is looking less 
and less likely that those clinically relevant diagnoses we are most familiar with, such as 
depression and anxiety, will even be preserved at the level of neurobiological mechanisms 
(2015). 
The search for breakdowns in stage one is Murphy’s mistake. On my view, theorists 
and clinicians will not need lines to be drawn between sickness and heath or normality and 
abnormality at stage one because the purpose of a stage two research program is precisely 
to supply these kind of normative considerations. This way researchers can refocus their 
efforts on “the pursuit of causal mechanisms that can undergird new therapies” (Tabb, ms). 
This will involve, as philosopher of psychiatry Kathryn Tabb has recently put it, dropping 
the pretense that “psychiatry’s scientific and practical objects are one and the same,” so 
that, “the fits and starts of biomedical research need not immediately impact clinical 
nosology” (Tabb, ms).  
Care must be taken therefore, that we do not use an understanding of human 
diversity like that provided by the LTC account to double down on our commitment to the 
assumption that conceptually distinct mental disorders will fall out of further work with a 
project like the RDoC. Theuer and Hartner warn researchers of this possibility when they 
argue that “[p]sychiatry cannot hope to map diagnostically useful categories on to 
underlying multilevel mechanisms, no matter how complicated, because psychiatry is 
uniquely and precariously situated at the boarder of empirical facts and values” (2015). At 
the present time, it is not clear whether the RDoC is committed to keeping conceptual and 
methodological distance between the lab and clinic. As the NIMH currently notes,  
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“[t]o date, there has been general consensus that the science is not yet well 
enough developed to permit neuroscience-based classification. However, at 
some point, it is necessary to instantiate such approaches if the field is ever 
to reach the point where advances in genomics, pathophysiology, and 
behavioral science can inform diagnosis in a meaningful way. RDoC 
represents the beginning of such a long-term project” (2015). 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have tried to show two things. First, that Murphy’s account of a two stage 
methodology for clinical psychiatry generates a taxonomy of breakdowns that cannot fully 
capture what is interesting about mental illness, and that some serious rethinking of its 
methodology is in order. Second that the way forward is to recommit ourselves to the 
methodological separation of psychiatry’s descriptive and evaluative stages. Avenues for 
further research include critical assessment of what place normative concepts like well-
being and flourishing have in psychiatry, and how they help define the class of mental 
disorders. Ultimately, I hope that clear thinking about both stages will lead to clarification 
of concepts like mental disorder and diagnostic category. 
As I have argued, it is a mistake to think that the sciences of the mind can only be 
helpful for psychiatric diagnosis if they can determine what is normal or abnormal. The 
first stage of psychiatry is useful not for identifying whether a patient is suffering, but how. 
Calvin, his caretakers, and his therapists are best suited to answer the first question.
 22
 And 
when they need to find what therapeutic intervention will best help him, a taxonomy of the 
many possible human cognitive mechanisms and their functions seems exactly the place to 
look. At this second stage, clinicians may well make use of information regarding the 
statistical normality of Calvin’s functioning, in general, or perhaps even relative to a 
particular population. Our lack of ability to draw neat lines around mental disorder on 
purely statistical grounds should be expected and embraced.
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 I do not mean to imply that there is some sort of priority in time here, such that stage two must happen 
before stage one or vice versa. Indeed, if purely descriptive, stage one researchers can act more or less 
autonomously from the clinic using a schema like the RDoC. 
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Self-knowledge is a difficult thing. Many have had the experience of knowing that a friend 
or partner is in a bad mood before she herself realizes it. Similarly with mental illness, it 
seems that a person may be sick without realizing it, or even while denying it outright. 
Anosognosia, the lack of awareness that one is mentally ill, is most visible in cases of 
dementia or brain damage, but recent insights in psychology have shown that human beings 
generally lack accurate introspective awareness in matters of our own well-being.
1
 Getting 
this right—whether or not someone is flourishing psychologically—is crucial in psychiatry, 
and self-report cannot always be relied upon. 
At the same time, many have been in the unfortunate position of having to defend 
themselves from harmful accusations that they are unwell. Take, for example, the early 20
th
 
century pathologization of homosexuality. No doubt there was agreement on some 
descriptive facts between psychiatrists and their subjects, but such diagnoses are none the 
less inappropriate because the evaluative standards they are based in are unjustified. Any 
institution which enforces unjustified evaluative standards is harmful, and depending on 
what normative scheme is operative in our schools, prisons, and clinics, we are in danger of 
characterizing, and thereby mistreating, individuals as unwell who aren’t. Theorists should 
have some principled way to resist what I will call the problem of paternalism in psychiatry, 
the frequent occurrence of clinical intervention—including diagnosis itself—which conflicts 
with an individual’s psychological flourishing.  
In this paper, I will address the problem of paternalism in psychiatry by framing it 
in terms of anosognosia. In the first section, I will elaborate on the complexity of 
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paternalism, by situating it in both its philosophical and historical context. Following the 
work of Daniel Groll I will argue that, in the face of avowals from competent patients that 
they are not ill, the burden of proof falls on the clinician to show that a diagnosis is justified. 
In section two, following Valerie Tiberius and Alexandria Plakias’ work on well-being, I will 
consider what principles can provide such justification. I will argue that a theory with 
properly justified evaluative standards for psychiatric diagnosis must have normative 
authority. I consider George Graham’s account of mental disorder in his 2010 book, The 
Disordered Mind, and argue that this contemporary account also fails to have normative 
authority. Finally in section three I will argue that in order to solve the problem of 
paternalism, psychiatry must ground what it means to be mentally ill
2
 or mentally healthy in 
the concerns of individual patients, and consider some objections to this view. 
 
1. The problem of Paternalism 
The problem of paternalism in clinical psychiatry has a complex history. Centrally, it 
involves whether and how clinicians meet two rather uncontroversial standards in their 
reasoning about patients: first, that they be consilient with the other sciences of the mind, 
and second, that they use justified evaluative standards for psychiatric diagnosis. 
Historically, many different evaluative standards have been employed in diagnosing mental 
disorders, and not all standards have successfully captured only true cases of mental illness. 
To understand the problem of paternalism in psychiatry, then, one must bring together 
several threads. First, in 1.1 I will consider, generally, what makes an action paternalist. 
Then in 1.2 I will consider the harms involved in psychiatric diagnosis, especially 
inaccurate diagnosis. In 1.3 then, I will be able to articulate what makes paternalist action in 
clinical psychiatry especially problematic. Finally in 1.4, I will illustrate how the problem of 
                                                            
2
 Following work in earlier chapters, these terms will be used in the following ways for clarificatory purposes: 
mental illness refers to any way of being in which an individual's flourishing is significantly impaired or limited 
by some features of their psychology irrespective of what those features are, mental disorder refers to a 
psychological condition fitting one or more diagnostic categories that causes mental illness, and typical 
deviation refers to a psychological condition fitting one or more diagnostic categories irrespective of whether 
there is mental illness. To my mind, the interesting question here is the question of whether or not a patient 
knows they are mentally ill, though most theorists frame this in terms of disorder—of course, disorder implies 
illness but not vice-versa. 
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paternalism arises in contemporary theorizing about mental disorder, using two 
hypothetical examples. 
 
1.1 First Pass: What Makes an Action Paternalist?  
In his article on the subject, philosopher Daniel Groll suggests that the concept of 
paternalism in medicine is best seen as a conflict between two principles central to modern 
medical ethics. As he summarizes, 
“[t]he principle of beneficence (henceforth the ‘beneficence principle’) 
enjoins clinicians to act in ways that are ultimately good for the patients in 
their charge. The second central principle of medical ethics is that of 
respect for autonomy (henceforth the ‘autonomy principle’), which enjoins 
clinicians to, unsurprisingly, respect the autonomy of their patients. This 
means, roughly, that clinicians must respect the patient’s decision about his 
medical care” (Groll, p. 195, 2014, italics added).  
The rationale of the beneficence principle is fairly straightforward. In a simplistic sense, the 
goal of psychiatric treatment is to heal or help people flourish psychologically, and 
therefore clinicians must act in ways that are good for patients. The rationale of the 
autonomy principle, on the other hand, deals with patients’ rights. Every individual has the 
right to autonomy over their own person, and others ought to respect this. As Groll is quick 
to point out, respecting patients’ rights and patients’ good can sometimes come into 
conflict. Especially when a patient makes decisions that run counter to her interests, “[t]he 
specter of medical paternalism arises in this conflict: clinicians act paternalistically when, 
for the sake of the beneficence principle, they override or ignore the autonomy principle” 
(p. 197, 2014). More generally, we may understand paternalism as acting for the sake of a 
subject’s good regardless of their will. Psychiatric diagnosis and subsequent clinical 
intervention, when these actions ignore patient autonomy, is paternalist. 
Not all cases of ignoring an individual’s autonomy for the sake of their good are 
necessarily impermissible, of course. Consider what you might do to prevent a non-native 
language speaker from walking onto a minefield. Though it counts as paternalist, it seems 
you would be perfectly justified to physically restrain that person, at least until they could 
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be made to understand the danger that lies ahead (Groll, 2014). Nevertheless, whether 
permissible or impermissible, paternalism implies wrongdoing in virtue of violating the 
autonomy principle. Paternalist action is pro tanto wrong. For this reason, Groll argues, 
“the burden of proof will fall on the clinician (or philosopher) that wants to argue that 
paternalism is justified when dealing with competent patients” (p. 197, 2014).  
 
1.2 Is Psychiatric Diagnosis Harmful? 
What makes paternalist action in clinical psychiatry especially risky? Wanting to help make 
people ‘better’, in whatever sense is appropriate, is an honest aspiration—but care must be 
taken about what is meant by ‘better’. Who gets to decide who is mentally ill, and when, is 
of grave importance when the downstream effects of receiving a psychiatric diagnosis can 
include limiting the autonomy of the diagnosed. Because diagnosing an individual as having 
a mental disorder can be a way of saying that they have a condition that is bad and ought to 
be corrected, and that their pattern of behavior is somehow deviant or harmful, psychiatric 
diagnosis can be, and has been, used as a tool of social control. And while diagnostic 
categories themselves already carry evaluative content—we tend to treat individuals 
diagnosed as mentally ill prejudicially in comparison to those we consider healthy (Banaji, 
2013)—it has often been the case that those on the receiving end of psychiatric diagnosis 
come from stigmatized, disadvantaged, or disenfranchised groups (Satcher, 2001).  
For example, there is much controversy surrounding the diagnosis of disorders 
commonly treated with psychoactive drugs such as antipsychotics, stimulants, and Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs). Critics argue that a conflict of interest arising 
between psychiatrists and the pharmaceutical industry’s representatives and lobbyists has 
compromised prescription practices, and led to a dramatic increase in the diagnosis of 
disorders such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), autism, and 
depression and anxiety disorders (Healy, 2012; Elliot, 2004). The worry is not just that 
these disorders have somehow been ‘invented’, but that the medicalization of these 
individuals causes them harm (Hacking, 2006).  
There are also clear historical cases of diagnostic categories which functioned as 
nothing more than a means of institutionalized oppression. Homosexuality, hysteria, and 
drapetomania, for example, have all once been considered mental disorders. Indeed, 
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homosexuality continued to be classified as a mental disorder as late as 1973 in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), despite several studies at the 
time that showed that homosexual behavior is not linked to serious distress or disturbance. 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, feeling faint, nervous, or irritable, or ‘causing trouble’ 
were thought to be symptoms of a sexual dysfunction afflicting women specifically 
(Foucault, 1964; Murphy 2006).
3
 And perhaps the most shocking case of codified cultural 
norms, drapetomania, was a diagnosis given to slaves in the years leading up to the civil war, 
characterized by ‘the compulsion to flee’ (distinguished from dyesthaesia Aethiopica, a 
slave’s lack of respect for the property rights of her owners) (Murphy, 2006). All in all, 
western psychiatrists have often been “willing or merely compliant agents of political 
oppression” when it comes to psychiatric diagnosis (Lewontin et al 1984 p.167). 
It would be nice to think of drapetomania as a historical artifact, but there are 
contemporary DSM diagnoses with an eerily similar flavor. Take, for example 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) and Conduct Disorder (CD), diagnoses given, 
mainly to children and adolescents of color in the United States, characterized by 
aggressive and anti-social behavior. Even taking for granted that these are genuine mental 
illnesses that cause individuals to suffer, it is quite likely that the diagnostic label itself 
perpetuates the conditions of social inequality that cause its symptoms. As Nancy Nyquist 
Potter puts it, “[t]he concern is that schools and other institutions are not merely identifying 
an existent mental disorder, but are creating the conditions under which that disorder 
thrives” (p. 190, 2014). Cases like this introduce the worry that psychiatric practice today is 
still merely a way of pathologizing unwanted behaviors, and that its prescriptions do not 
actually encourage psychological flourishing.  
 
1.3 Paternalism on Rough Epistemic Terrain 
Even given the above considerations, we should take seriously the idea that there is genuine 
mental suffering in individuals that can be explained naturally, whether by recourse to 
social and environmental facts or underlying neuropathology, or both. This allows the 
discipline of psychiatry to be situated as consilient with the other sciences of the mind, 
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which is essential to good clinical reasoning. Further, when psychiatry is grounded in 
objective facts about the individuals it characterizes, the possibility for culturally relative 
norms about what behaviors are and aren’t desirable to compromise psychiatric practice is 
limited.  
At the same time however, conceptualizing the discipline of psychiatry as a science 
seems to put a sharper point on the basic problem. While it is true that psychiatry must 
remain objective in the above sense, it is also essentially a normative enterprise. Evaluative 
concepts such as health and wellness are crucial to psychiatric diagnosis. Indeed, diagnostic 
categories themselves carry evaluative as well as motivational content. We consider a 
person diagnosed with a mental disorder as having the same kinds of reasons to seek 
treatment as they would if they were diagnosed as diabetic.
4
  
For all these reasons, theorists and practitioners interested in mental disorder are 
under an additional burden to make justified diagnoses. The puzzle of anosognosia 
manifests itself in the difficulty of achieving this goal, that is, accurately and objectively 
identifying mental illness from a third person perspective, while at the same time respecting 
the individual subject’s autonomy. This puzzle is not unique to psychiatric medicine.5 But it 
is perhaps made more difficult when, compared to symptoms of physical illness, symptoms 
of psychological illness are often less readily apparent, less well understood, and 
confounded by the tough philosophical and epistemic issues that surround the mental.  
In other words, what makes paternalism in clinical psychiatry especially problematic 
is that it occurs in such uncertain epistemic terrain. Symptom recognition relies on the 
judgement of clinicians, and clinicians are fallible.
6
 In a recent paper, for example, Michael 
Bishop and J. D. Trout, list and review nine families of diagnostic method currently used. 
Some of these methods, especially those which rely more heavily on the opinion of the 
clinician, have “an appalling track record” when it comes to accuracy (Bishop & Trout, p. 
1027, 2013). Structured methods like computer-aided interview fare better but are far from 
perfect. Some methods have not been validated at all (Bishop & Trout, 2013). Even with 
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 For an interesting and nuanced perspective on this see Arpaly (2005). 
5
 Think, for instance, of those who choose to undergo helminthic therapy for autoimmune disease. They may 
deny that they are sick, while fully aware that they now host hookworms. 
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expert skill, clinicians may fall prey to a number of cognitive biases which can influence 
diagnosis, such as confirmation bias, availability bias, stereotyping, and others (Poland & 
Caplan, 2004). Epistemic difficulties create difficulties in producing justifications. 
Given that the burden of proof is on the clinician to justify paternalist action with 
explicit consideration of the individual patient’s circumstances, it is surprising how frequent 
paternalist diagnosis and intervention occurs.
7
 The problem of paternalism in clinical 
psychiatry is the problem of the frequent occurrence of clinical intervention—including 
diagnosis—on the basis of unjustified standards. Overriding a patient’s autonomy in a 
psychiatric context should be considered unwarranted by default, unless it can be shown 
that this action is all things considered good for the patient. Without this subsequent 
justification, the clinician fails to employ good clinical reasoning, and their paternalist 
actions are harmful. 
 
1.4 Grappling with the Descriptive and the Evaluative in Psychiatry 
Criticizing the state of psychiatric practice today is easy. What of how philosophers of 
psychiatry think about mental disorder in idealized contexts? Does ideal diagnostic 
procedure employ good clinical reasoning? 
In their helpful essay, Pieter Adriaens and Andreas De Block sort extant views of 
mental disorder into three groups. As they write,  
“[t]he philosophical debate about mental disorder is mainly a discussion 
between normativists and naturalists. Naturalists hold that (mental) health is 
a natural concept, while normativists argue that it is a normative one. A 
third strand defends a hybrid concept, claiming that the concept of mental 
disorder involves a conjunction of facts and values” (Adriaens & De Block, 
2011, p. 19).  
All three groups are concerned with mental activity which is in some sense abnormal. 
According to Adriaens and DeBlock, “[a]ll naturalist approaches are convinced that a 
                                                            
7
 This has prompted some theorists to conclude that the discipline “disempowers patients while justifying 
professional authority” (Bracken & Thomas, p. 125, 2013). Indeed, there are large groups of individuals who 
see themselves as ‘survivors’ of their experiences with clinical psychiatry (Bracken & Thomas, 2013). The 
stigma against the survivor movement among practitioners is so strong, it has lead supportive clinicians to 
write about resisting bias pseudonymously (Anthony, 2004). 
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mental disorder is a deviation from a norm, but unlike normativists they argue that the 
relevant norm is a biological norm” (Adriaens & De Block, 2011, p. 19, italics in original). 
So, in all three cases, it is abnormality which is supposed to justify the evaluative claim that 
a patient is disordered. In order to better understand the difference between normativist 
and naturalist views, let’s consider their judgments in the following two cases. 
 
JOHN HENRY is a successful, high-powered lawyer at a Washington firm. 
He is well-known for taking cases on behalf of racial minorities and 
LGBTQ individuals, which are both communities of which he considers 
himself a constituent. John is known around the office for putting in long 
hours, much longer than any of his colleagues, often at the expense of 
restful sleep. He sometimes feels that his job puts him under considerable 
stress, but, at the same time, dislikes taking holidays or breaks. John 
Henry’s physician has suggested that he ought to monitor his blood 
pressure more closely. Recently, he has been experiencing short periods of 
trembling and shortness of breath. 
 
VINCENT lives alone on a remote piece of property in the Pacific 
Northwest. After college he began to remove himself from his social circles, 
and now spends most of his time in his home, making highly detailed 
wooden sculptures, based on the suggestions of ‘other voices.’ Vincent has 
no phone or internet access, and interacts mostly with the owner of the 
general store in a nearby town. He make a modest living by occasionally 
making a sale of a sculpture. His buyers find him to be distant and abrasive, 
and are often disturbed by his behavior, and lack of adherence to social 
norms. 
 
Beginning with normativist approaches, then, take the normativist view called 
constructivism. Constructivism about mental disorders, as it is summarized by philosopher 
of psychiatry Dominic Murphy in his book Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, is a view 
distinguished by several related theses. It takes it to be the case that there are no objective 
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facts that one can appeal to, to decide whether or not someone has a mental disorder. 
Instead, all the relevant facts are social ones, as any talk of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ is 
grounded in our values. It follows from this that there can be no science about mental 
disorder. Mental disorders are just constructs used to talk about certain kinds of norm 
transgressions (Murphy, 2006). 
As I have argued, this lack of scientific objectivity is bad clinical reasoning. On a 
constructivist account, whether or not someone is disordered will not necessarily accord 
with the underlying causes of their behavior. For example, it is not whether Vincent hears 
voices, but whether he admits to hearing them or reacts to them in any other way, which 
makes him stand out. At least today in the West, Vincent deviates from common social 
norms. Plausibly therefore, a constructivist may consider a person like him to be 
disordered and therefore mentally ill, whether or not he hears voices at all. 
In addition to being bad clinical reasoning, the very relativization of constructivist 
judgments of Vincent to a particular (Western, contemporary) set of norms illuminates 
how the view is infected with paternalism. One might easily imagine that Vincent would be 
motivated to deny accusations that he is unwell, while agreeing that he hears voices, or that 
he prefers to be alone. Is this a case of anosognosia, or is Vincent correct that he is not 
mentally ill? What makes it the case that he ought to adhere to these norms? Because how 
Vincent himself fares is never examined, constructivism cannot provide a defensible 
answer.
8
 We do not know whether this prescription is good for Vincent. 
At the other extreme from constructivism is a naturalist view Murphy calls simple 
objectivism, which takes objective facts about human psychology to be the only relevant 
facts. To be mentally disordered according to simple objectivism, then, is to function 
atypically relative to our best current theory of psychological functioning. If our best 
neuroscience says that John Henry’s, or Vincent’s brain or psychological functioning is 
atypical, then they are disordered.  
One way of caching this out, as Murphy mentions, is to conclude that there are no 
such things as mental disorders, only somatic diseases. Thomas Szasz appears to have been 
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 Conceivably, there may be a normativist view other than constructivism which takes the psychological 
flourishing of the individual into account. I argue however, that as long as the place of descriptive facts and 
consilence with other sciences of the mind are ignored, normativist accounts should be rejected. 
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an eliminativist about the mental, and famously argued for such a view (Murphy, 2006; 
Szasz, 1974). However, even though physicalists might think that any kind of talk about 
psychological entities will have an explanation in terms of the behavior of physical entities, 
it does not follow from this that there is nothing distinctively interesting about the sciences 
of the mind and their subject. Christopher Boorse, for example, would be open to 
diagnosing John Henry and Vincent with mental disorders, as long as it were demonstrated 
that they deviate from the statistical biological norms of human psychological functioning 
(Adriaens & DeBlock, 2011).
9
 
Again, both John Henry and Vincent may agree that they are statistically atypical in 
some way, and still claim that they do not need any kind of psychiatric intervention. Do 
they have accurate self-knowledge in this regard? While Boorse’s view does effectively 
consider some important descriptive facts, whether or not the subject is flourishing 
psychologically is not part of what is examined. Further, as I have argued, it is unclear how 
statistical atypicality alone, without some evaluative theory, can be a guide to mental illness. 
Atypicality, after all, is a notion at some distance from suffering or distress.
10
 As Murphy 
(2006) puts it, evaluative judgments cannot be all there is to mental disorder, but neither 
can they be neglected. Paternalism again rears its ugly head; naturalist accounts make 
claims about what is and is not mental disorder without the aid of any evaluative theory to 
justify them. 
 
2. Normative Authority 
Both the normativist and naturalist accounts examined above run into a similar kind of 
trouble. When confronted with plausible denials of the accuracy of psychiatric diagnosis, 
neither account has the right tools to draw a line between misdiagnosis on one hand, and 
illness and anosognosia on the other. Without the right normative theory, they fall prey to 
paternalism. 
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 Boorse makes a distinction here between disease and illness, arguing that an individual with a disease is ill 
when that disease is harmful to them. This suggests to me some terminological dispute, and that debate 
between Boorse and his contemporaries may be resolved by examining the referents of ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ 
respectively. 
10
 Adriaens and DeBlock (2011) further note that not all share the optimism that “a good naturalist account of 
the concept of mental disorder provides the necessary tools to revolutionize psychiatric classification” (p. 23). 
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There are several important questions which follow from the failures of naturalist 
and normativist accounts of mental disorder. One question concerns just what the right 
normative theory for psychiatry is. Investigating mental disorder without first understanding 
what makes a condition an illness is in some sense putting the cart before the horse. A 
second question concerns how this normative theory is related to the right descriptive or 
explanatory theory. Clinicians must be able to show how their evaluative claims have a hold 
on their subjects. Answering both of these goes beyond the scope of this paper, so in what 
follows, I will focus on the first question. Here in section two I will highlight one feature 
which is essential for a normative theory with properly justified evaluative standards. 
Namely, it must have normative authority.  
To understand how normative authority is crucial to psychiatric diagnosis, it is 
helpful to examine a similar theoretical issue. In particular, the tension between the 
putatively distinct realms of fact and value is a familiar challenge to those philosophers 
working in the ethics of well-being and human flourishing—for example in the philosophical 
literature surrounding the fast-growing field of positive psychology, which aims to 
investigate well-being using the psychological sciences. In their paper on well-being, 
Tiberius and Plakias articulate two competing pressures on a theory of well-being, noting 
that on one hand, “[w]ell-being aims to pick out an empirical phenomenon that can be 
measured, compared, and (one hopes) realized in people’s lives”, and on the other hand 
that, “it has a kind of normative significance: it makes sense to promote well-being, 
procuring it is a good thing to do” (p. 401, 2010, italics in original). Thus, as Tiberius and 
Plakias describe the challenge, a good theory of well-being must be responsive to the twin 
demands of empirical and normative adequacy. As they write, 
“[o]ur argument aims to characterize well-being in a way that is both 
empirically grounded and able to play the role in our ethical practice that it 
needs to play. Normatively, if our account of well-being ends up being 
something we have no reason to care about, then we have gone wrong 
somewhere. Empirically, if an account of well-being implies that it cannot be 
investigated, measured, and achieved, there is reason to look elsewhere,” (p. 
402, 2010, italics in original). 
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What exactly gives a theory the kind of normative significance which would justify 
paternalist action? According to Tiberius and Plakias, a theory that is normatively adequate 
has normative authority, “[t]he feature in virtue of which people have a reason to follow the 
imperatives of a normative theory” (p. 419, 2010). In other words, a theory that concerns 
the kind of human-centered value that is important in discussions of flourishing is one that 
concerns the attributive/relational kind of good, good for, where one part of that relation is 
the individual it is about. It speaks to individuals’ interests. Without this link, dictums of 
the theory will at best be uninteresting. Individuals may find that the theory does not 
address their concerns or actually help them flourish. At worst, individuals may be subject 
to the kinds of paternalist concerns outlined earlier—they may find that the theory harms 
them if its imperatives take the form of social or legal demands that can limit autonomy. 
Because psychiatric practice operates in exactly this kind of context, properly 
justified evaluative standards for psychiatric diagnosis are of utmost concern. In order to 
ensure that the concept of mental illness will be a useful one for theorizing about human 
flourishing which picks out a real psychological phenomenon in human lives, it must have 
normative authority. In particular, we should find that (1) what the theory recommends 
actually promotes the interests of everyone to whom the theory is supposed to apply, and 
(2) that there are standards of justification for these recommendations.
11
 In what follows in 
2.1 I will consider how one kind of hybrid theory of mental disorder fares in this regard. 
 
2.1 Failures to Provide Normative Authority  
The standard way of reserving some place for both normative judgments and objective facts 
in a theory of mental disorder is to analyze the concept, and see what theses if any are 
supported by our commonsense intuitions about what counts as disorder. This 
methodology has attracted many contemporary analytic philosophers, who typically share 
the view that some combination of Jerome Wakefield’s ‘harm-dysfunction’ thesis and a 
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 It should be noted that I diverge from Tiberius and Plakias’ work here in one important respect. In their 
account of well-being, Tiberius and Plakias rely on a kind of internalism about reasons, and suggest that 
theories with normative authority supply individuals with motivating and justifying reasons. Personally, I am 
unsure that human individuals are sufficiently like the kinds of agents most reasons internalists are concerned 
about, and thus would like to distance myself from reasons-talk. That said, what I have to say here should be 
compatible with many different accounts of what and individuals’ ‘interests’ are. 
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folk-psychological picture of the mind will generate the concept of mental disorder as it is 
‘prototypically understood’ (Graham, 2010). Following Murphy, we may call this hybrid 
account the ‘orthodox view’ (Murphy, 2006). 
According to the orthodox view, a particular dysfunction is a mental disorder when 
it is both distinctively mental, and harmful to an individual. Clinicians decide which kinds 
of dysfunctions are mental by appealing to existing disciplinary conventions (Murphy, 
2006). Perhaps, John Henry should be diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, and Vincent 
with schizotypal personality disorder, as outlined in the DSM-V. Of course, the orthodox 
theorist must have some way of determining both when an atypicality is a dysfunction, and 
what counts as harm. As long as that notion of harm is tangled in existing disciplinary 
conventions of psychiatry as it is practiced today, then there is a good chance that our 
contingent cultural values guide inquiry in an unjustified way (Murphy, 2006). In his 2010 
book, The Disordered Mind, Graham attempts to give one such hybrid account. In the 
next section, I will argue that his account fails to have normative authority because it does 
not ground what it means to be mentally ill or mentally healthy in the concerns of the 
individual patient. 
 
2.1.1 George Graham on Mental Disorder 
Graham’s account of mental disorder consists of four theses. On his view, a mental 
disorder is a disability in one or more rational or basic psychological capacities (rationality-
disability thesis), that has harmful or potentially harmful consequences (harm thesis). This 
disability must have its source in both ‘brute neural causes’ as well as more central, rational, 
or ‘intentionalistic’ activity (mixed-source thesis), where the reason-responsive capacities of 
the source in question are impaired, but not destroyed entirely (some preservation of 
rationality thesis) (2010). 
As a hybrid account, one of the virtues of Graham’s view is his recognition that 
normative considerations must be built directly into the concept of mental disorder. In fact, 
three of his four theses make significant evaluative claims. The harm thesis invokes the idea 
that mental disorders directly inhibit the flourishing of their subjects. However, this thesis 
leaves open exactly what constitutes a harm. This is where the rationality-disability thesis, 
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and the some preservation of rationality thesis come in. Graham proposes that healthy 
human beings exhibit some standards of rationality, and that the preservation of this 
rational capacity is what is crucial for mental health. He argues that when a disorder “gums 
up the works” of our ability to meet this standard, we are categorically harmed (Graham, p. 
8, 2010). 
According to Graham, then, an individual’s irrationality or unreasonableness can 
serve as a standard for mental disorder. Of course, it is one thing to claim that there are 
some or other norms or standards of reasoning, and another to claim that a particular 
theory of rationality applies universally; especially if such a theory is to be grounded in facts 
about how human beings actually reason. Such cross-cultural claims are notoriously 
difficult to justify.
12
 A theory of rationality must be assessed on its own terms before we can 
even understand its applicability to a theory of mental disorder. 
The theory of rationality Graham endorses is one quite familiar to Western analytic 
philosophers of mind, which uses a Western, folk-psychological framework to explain 
behavior. Graham calls this the rationality-in-Intentionality thesis (RIT), which posits that, 
“a rational person in the RIT sense, ideally is not merely devoid of illogical 
or inconsistent attitudes, but someone with a definite positive description of 
their character and goals in life. If possible, they choose after deliberation, 
avoid acting on unreflective impulses, and maintain a certain level of 
prudence, self-regard or self-responsibility that balances their present or 
current preferences against next weeks, and next years, those of midlife and 
possible old age,” (Graham, p. 122, 2010). 
To further illustrate this kind of rationality, Graham refers to several exemplars 
which he takes to be paradigmatic of mental disorder. Many diagnoses found in the DSM, 
including depression and anxiety disorders, delusions, and substance abuse disorders, 
describe ‘irrational’ ways of behaving, in the RIT sense. It is because of this apparent 
irrationality that we should consider individuals with these symptoms as unwell.  
                                                            
12
 As meticulously outlined in Henrich et. al (2010), a picture is beginning to emerge from recent empirical 
evidence that—to the extent there is a core of human psychological nature—this core is much smaller than was 
thought even fifteen years ago. For more on how this effects psychiatric diagnosis see the previous chapter. 
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Take John Henry, then—so described, John Henry plausibly represents many 
upper-middle class professionals in the United States, and without knowing much more 
about him, we may classify his behavior as irrational in the RIT sense. Based on his work 
schedule, his physical condition, and his physician’s advice, John Henry seems to be 
spending a lot more time thinking about what’s happening in the next five years than what’s 
happening in the next forty, perhaps sacrificing his well-being or ability to meet his goals 
later in life for the ability to meet his goals now. On Graham’s view, this kind of behavior is 
disordered. More obviously, Vincent is irrational in the RIT sense as well simply because 
he hears voices that do not correspond to his environment. Of course, John Henry and 
Vincent may claim to be unmotivated by Graham’s injunctions to ‘act rationally’. Indeed it 
is likely that both disagree with Graham over just what behaving rationally might consist in. 
But can they sensibly claim that they are not mentally ill, or do they suffer from 
anosognosia? 
Consider Vincent: perhaps he finds his behavior perfectly warranted, arguing that 
he is happiest on his own engaging in artistic creation and his own aesthetic experience of 
the world, and that therefore he is neither irrational nor disordered for doing so. Of 
course, whether or not one is behaving rationally does not come down to believing so. But 
it should be noted that the kinds of recommendations the RIT thesis gives are based on a 
picture of the mind which takes paradigmatic human behavior to be characterized by 
accurate and reflexive self-direction, and that this has recently been called into question by 
a growing body of literature that sees much of human cognition as automatic and 
unreflective (Doris, 2009).
13
 Even if Graham’s picture of rationality succeeds in defeating 
these concerns, however, a more serious problem remains. 
Remember, mental health, like well-being, should be good for an individual; the 
prescriptions of Graham’s theory, in this case for Vincent to ‘act rationally’, should be good 
for Vincent. As Vincent’s protestations reveal, it is an open question whether seeking 
treatment for auditory hallucinations would be good for Vincent’s psychological flourishing. 
Graham’s RIT analysis seems to miss this about Vincent’s case, instead making some 
                                                            
13
 Graham, and others who endorse these kinds of reflectivist views—are under a burden to show that we can 
even come close to being ‘devoid of illogical or inconsistent attitudes’, or that we choose after deliberation 
and avoid unreflective impulses much of the time. For more see Doris (2015). 
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alarmingly specific assumptions about what is good for him without establishing that this is 
necessarily the case. A clinician following Graham’s theory would diagnosis Vincent 
without considering whether Vincent shared that conclusion, and without considering the 
possibility that he is not in fact harmed by his ‘irrationality’. Unless Graham can show that 
acting rationally in the RIT sense optimizes every individual’s interests, his account of 
mental illness fails have normative authority. 
 
3. Eliminating Paternalism 
It is possible to extend the above arguments to any theory which grounds mental health in 
norms external to the individual. Tiberius and Plakias make a similar point about so-called 
objective list theories of well-being, noting that it is difficult to see how accounts with 
specific norms can have a legitimate claim to be action guiding given the gap between those 
normative claims and subjective experience (Tiberius & Plakias, 2010). Indeed, if it is 
possible that human individuals (however best conceived) do not share the same list of 
things which ground their well-being then objective list theories will not provide normative 
authority.  
Similarly with mental health, an evaluative standard that is not grounded in what 
would actually be better for each actual patient fails to have normative authority. This 
suggests that mental health should be located in the subjective point of view. In order to 
solve the problem of paternalism, psychiatry must ground what it means to be mentally ill 
or mentally healthy in the concerns of individual patients. Whatever the right normative 
theory has to say about John Henry and Vincent, it must pay due respect to their 
flourishing. For this reason, the right normative theory for psychiatric diagnosis must be 
individualist; it must ground what it means to be mentally ill or mentally healthy in the 
concerns of the individual subject it treats. I will have a bit more to say on this idea in 3.1, 
before considering a number of objections to the view in 3.2.
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3.1 Individualism about Mental Health 
Individualism about mental illness does not mean that we ought to be subjectivist with 
regard to psychiatric diagnosis. Many have expressed worries about making such a move, as 
this would not allow for the fact that individuals do not often know what is best for them. In 
his book, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, philosopher Dan Haybron argues from a wealth of 
empirical evidence that “[i]ndividuals’ judgments about their own lives do not bear anything 
like the kind of authority that common opinion takes them to” (p.80, 2008). Of course, this 
is just to highlight the possibility of anosognosia. But individualism with respect to mental 
health, which denies that there is one objective list of norms that are necessarily good for all 
humans, is not the same as a subjective account that does not allow for fundamental errors 
about ones values or interests.
14
 Things are not good for individuals ‘just because’ they say 
so. Here, I am in agreement with Groll’s view that, “[i]n a normal clinical encounter, 
clinicians can have open, frank discussions with the patient about what is best for the 
patient without thereby acting paternalistically” (p. 191, 2014). 
Fortunately, exactly how to determine what is good for human beings is something 
that is being gradually revealed by empirical research on happiness and life-satisfaction. 
This can easily be extended to subjects of psychiatric care. It may even be the case that 
there is at least some statistical norm at work about what values and goals help human 
being flourish psychologically. Several philosophers have recently made an attempt at 
articulating values that most humans share in this sense, Haybron and Tiberius among 
them. Even if some set of values or virtues is important for all human beings in a statistical 
sense, however, it is not because of some special status those values have but because, 
contingently, they do in fact promote flourishing for most individuals.
15
 Researchers should 
be prepared to encounter some values or bases for flourishing which look strange from a 
Western perspective. 
                                                            
14
 This tripartite distinction (individualism vs. subjectivism vs. objectivism) is my main motivation for labeling 
this thesis ‘individualism’. There are other philosophical arenas that use this term differently. In his ground-
clearing book on the individual in the cognitive sciences Rob Wilson makes another important distinction, 
claiming that “individualism is the thesis that psychological states should be construed without reference to 
anything beyond the boundary of the individual who has those states… those who deny individualism are 
externalists” (p. 10, 2004). In this sense, my thesis is an externalist one, as what is good for the individual 
subject may depend on features of the environment beyond the boundaries of the individual. 
15
 For more on contemporary attempts to measure psychological well-being see the work of Kalisch et. al 




3.2 Objections Considered 
At first gloss, one may wonder why it is not as easy to tell whether someone has a mental 
disorder as it is to diagnose them with a physical disease. We don’t tend to take people 
seriously who disagree with their physicians over whether they have HIV or are paraplegic. 
But if we see these diagnoses as something beyond mere descriptions—as normative claims 
about health or injunctions to seek treatment—physical medicine is equally philosophically 
murky. Disagreements over the concept of health apply to physical medicine as well 
(Boorse, 2011). Some disability advocates even claim that the idea that there is something 
‘wrong’ with their way of being is entirely a matter of unwarranted social conventions 
(Amundson, 1999). 
Either way, in both arenas there is an intuition that there must be more to disease 
and disorder than the interests of the individuals under evaluation.
16
 In this final section I 
will consider three forms of this intuition, which I will call the Successful Psychopath, 
Wellness Syndrome, and Conversion Therapy objections, and reject each.  
 
3.2.1 The Successful Psychopath 
Vincent hears voices. One might feel that this should be considered disordered whether it 
is good for Vincent or not. This raises the question of how we should treat patients who are 
considered to be less than fully rational (and perhaps, then, less than fully autonomous) 
(Dworkin, 2014). The thought is that facts about Vincent’s psychology undermine the 
significance of his avowals about what is good for him. Of course we all, to some extent, 
harbor false beliefs about what would be good for us, and this does not automatically 




Take an even harder case: that of the ‘successful psychopath,’ an individual who’s 
psychological functioning fits the DSM criteria for psychopathy, but who is also flourishing. 
                                                            
16
 Many thanks to Tim Schroeder for helpful discussions on this topic. 
17
 For a fuller discussion on the criteria for when a patient fails to be competent, see the concluding chapter. 
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The thought is that, if individualism about mental illness means the successful psychopath 
is no psychopath at all, then it is a reason to reject individualism. 
Suppose that on the right normative theory for psychiatry, the successful 
psychopath is indeed mentally healthy. As a first response, it should be stressed that this 
does not mean that there is nothing cognitively or neurologically atypical about him which 
is interesting from the point of view of the sciences of the mind and human behavior. If 
one means ‘psychopathy’ to pick out a typical deviation consisting of mere descriptive facts 
about an individual, then of course this label applies. But this is not how the dual nature of 
psychiatry works. 
I am willing to bite the bullet here, if it is indeed a bullet to bite. There may be 
interesting expressions of psychological atypicality which fit the criteria for mental illness in 
some cases but not others. The successful psychopath is a legitimate possibility.
18
 One 
additional virtue of this response, I think, is that it makes sense of what is going on in cases 
like the autism rights movement, and other neurodiversity movements, where individuals 
claim that their diagnosis is no disorder at all, but just another way of being on the 
spectrum of human psychological variation. There are many who assert that they live full, 




3.2.2 The Wellness Syndrome 
Perhaps these considerations lead you to the worry that individualism about mental illness 
leads to an opposite kind of problem—that of overinclusivity. As Geoffery Miller (2011) 
puts it there may be “no principled distinction between maladaptive disorder and ‘normal 
variation’,” in the discipline of psychiatry. As he writes, 
“[t]he implication is that almost all living humans beings have many 
mental disorders, mostly minor but some major, and these include not 
just DSM disorders like depression and schizophrenia, but diverse forms 
                                                            
18
 This has nothing to do with our areteic judgments, or judgments of responsibility. If the psychopath is also a 
murderer, we should surely put him in jail (but not because he is mentally ill… because he is a murderer!) 
19
 There may be a further worry here about psychological conditions which ‘gum up the works’ of individuals 
interests. In other words, what if what is best for the heroin addict is to sit around ingesting heroin until they 
die? This is a question I am very much interested in, but which depends on other features of the right 
normative theory for the discipline of psychiatry which go beyond the scope of this paper. 
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of stupidity, irrationality, religiosity, vices, and personality quirks” (p. viii, 
2011). 
Miller himself is comfortable with this possibility. I am as well. Whether or not it is 
considered a disorder, not having any coping skills, for example, is very much a problem of 
mental health, even if it doesn’t look like any diagnostic category we are currently familiar 
with. Consider one final case. 
 
OCTAVIA is a writer who works from home. She enjoys her work-life set 
up because it allows her to spend more time with her sister and nephews, 
who she lives with. Octavia has always considered herself to be distractible; 
growing up she had trouble focusing in school, and nowadays she spends 
more time reading blogs on the internet than she would like. Octavia is 
happy with her modest career success, but admits that she might be more 
productive if she were able to concentrate more easily. 
 
It seems clear that Octavia may enjoy the benefits of the therapeutic aspects of psychiatric 
practice to improve her life, just as John Henry and Vincent. That her problems are 
common or modest are not appropriate barriers to understanding them from a psychiatric 
perspective. 
 
3.2.3 Conversion Therapy 
One way to judge what would be good for a person, all things considered, is to ask how 
they would fare if their values or desires were other that what they are. John Henry, for 
instance, might flourish to a greater extent if he cared less about his political causes, 
because the good he would get from investing in a family life, for example, would outweigh 
the good he can get now. For my part, I am perfectly willing to accept the truth of this 
counterfactual claim, and so might John Henry. But he may find that he cannot simply 
decide to have other interests than the ones he does. There may be other forms of control 
he can take over his values, but if he does not want to exercise these options, then to 
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intervene would be to act against his will. For this reason I would deny that it has any 
implications for the justifiability of acting paternalistically on John Henry’s behalf.20 
What then, if a patient elects to change their desires in order to increase their good. 
Take one of the most controversial cases of this today, that of so called ‘conversion 
therapy’ for homosexuality. A patient may plausibly argue that, given the social 
circumstances they have been born into, including harms stemming from discrimination 
and institutionalized oppression, they would be better off with heteronormative desires. 
Does it follow that, on an individualist account of mental illness, homosexuality is a mental 
disorder? Absolutely not. Altering ones desires may effectively relieve a kind of suffering in 
this case, but the underlying cause of that suffering is a set of social facts rather than 
psychological ones. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have argued that clinical psychiatry faces a special kind of problem with 
paternalist action, the frequent occurrence of clinical intervention on the basis of unjustified 
standards. Because of this, in the face of avowals from competent patients that they are not 
ill, the burden of proof falls on the clinician to show that a diagnosis is justified. Further I 
have argued that clinical psychiatry must ground what it means to be mentally ill or 
mentally healthy in the concerns of individuals. 
Some of the considerations in the last section highlight the complex interaction 
between those psychological features of an individual which are bound by the skin and 
skull, and those which are features of being situated in a particular environment. This 
suggests the possibility that, as with well-being, individualism about mental illness may give 
way to a more contextualist view, where more emphasis is placed on living in a context that 
fosters mental health (for more see: Haybron, 2008). I see my arguments here are happily 
compatible with that move, and will have more to say about context in the next chapter.
                                                            
20
 Even supposing there was a magic pill that could alter desires, we should be cautious about what this action 
would even amount to. Recent evidence suggests that it is an individual’s moral traits that above all else 
determine their personal identity (Strohminger & Nichols, in press). Taking the pill may amount to changing 
the very person John Henry is, and this possibility is outside the scope of my considerations here.  
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4. STEWARDSHIP OF THE MIND: 





1. We Don’t Have to Be the Way We Are 
One of the most interesting things about being human is the emphasis we place on our 
betterment. Hardly even the most sainted among us are considered perfectly rational, 
perfectly virtuous, or perfectly healthy by any standard. The idea that there is room for 
improvement, along with the fact that we are able to change the way we are in a goal-
directed manner, then, invites a special kind of opportunity to do so. 
It is not always clear if one ought to change, or in what way. Human nature, human 
variability, and the possibility of a ‘transhuman’ or ‘posthuman’ future are all areas of 
intense philosophical debate. But there are also relatively mundane cases of betterment on 
which most would agree—if I get a hang nail I would do better to let it heal rather than pick 
at it all day. Cases of illness, especially mental illness, are similarly straightforward. The idea 
that someone is mentally ill automatically invokes the idea that she may change for the 
better.
1
 The further question is how. What is the recipe for therapeutic change in clinical 
psychiatry?  
To begin with, a proper account of how to effect therapeutic change should be 
consistent with our best theories of the human mind and human behavior. Particularly 
when it comes to identifying the specific clinical practices and techniques that best address 
mental illness, an improved understanding of what kinds of things we are affords an 
improved understanding of the most efficient kinds of leverage we have over ourselves, so
                                                            
1
 This is controversial, of course, but it will be one of the starting assumptions of what follows. For more on 
the normative character of the concept of mental health, see previous chapters. 
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to speak. In this paper, I will examine two extant and opposing pictures, and their influence 
on thinking about psychiatric therapy. First, what I will call the ‘traditional picture’ 
represents the dominant trend in Western thinking about the human mind. The traditional 
picture is not a view of the mind in itself, but a collection of views in philosophy and the 
human sciences distinguished by commitments to a species of ‘internalism’ about the mind. 
Second, what I will call the ‘ecological picture’ represents a rival trend that has been gaining 
influence in recent years. The ecological picture rejects internalism. 
As I intend to show, tacit reliance on the traditional picture has had a limiting 
influence on what is viewed as therapeutic intervention and hindered our pursuit of the 
question of therapeutic change. Under its influence, dealing with mental illness has been 
framed as an inward-focused process—deep reflection, will power, and perhaps the 
occasional pharmaceutical drug being the recognizable tools at hand (Saks, 2013).
2
 Clinical 
intervention, in other words, tends to be limited to the boundaries of the skin and skull. 
This is unfortunate for those with a practical interest in managing mental health, as it 
prevents many everyday methods of managing mental health from being seen as ‘real’ 
therapeutic techniques. By taking an ‘ecological turn’, therefore, psychiatric science can 
avail itself to a wider array of therapeutic techniques to investigate and assess. 
Throughout this paper, I will argue for two general claims. First, that a broadly 
ecological picture of the mind provides a better explanatory framework from which to 
understand both what has gone wrong in cases of mental illness, and how successful 
therapeutic interventions generate improvement. Second, that this explanatory fit in turn 
gives us new reasons to prefer ecological views over more orthodox views of the mind. An 
ecological perspective provides unique insights that can help teach us how to be better, 
mentally. Given the substantial impact of mental suffering worldwide, this is no mean feat. 
My defense of these claims will first involve spelling out what the traditional and 
ecological pictures are, and how they relate to each other. Once this has been done, in 
section two I will develop an ecological account of psychiatric therapy which casts human 
agents as stewards of their own—and often others’—cognitive ecology.3 From this ecological 
                                                            
2
 Illustrated not just by individual clinicians, but by the methodology of dominant research trends such as 
pharmacology and behavioral genetics. 
3
 In some sense, managing mental health can be thought of as a collective endeavor, mutually enforced 
through our social relations. This prospect is included in the stewardship picture. 
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perspective, therapeutic techniques are best conceived of as a species of what I will call 
agential technologies: a set of often non-obvious methods and strategies of control 
supporting goal directed cognition and behavior, whose pathway of influence over behavior 
and psychological functioning often loops outside the boundaries of the skin and skull. 
Agential technologies facilitate agency in situations where our internal resources may not be 
enough, intervening on psychological features which underlie mental illness, and thereby 
supporting goal directed change. Finally in section three, I will turn to a number of 
contemporary proposals for improving psychological well-being from the philosophical and 
psychological literature. I will show that, in successful cases, goal-directed change is 
mediated ecologically—that is, becoming mentally healthy is about managing one’s cognitive 
ecology in the right way.
4
 
In the remainder of section one, then, it is my task to set out the relevant 
philosophical picture. I begin in section 1.1 by drawing together several contemporary 
analyses of the human mind as traditionally conceived, followed in section 1.2 by reviewing 
arguments for rejecting this picture in favor of a broadly ecological one. In section 1.3 I will 
elaborate the ecological picture using several recent philosophical projects which apply this 
perspective to more concrete domains of human cognition. 
 
1.1 The Traditional Picture 
From a historical perspective, it is generally agreed that Descartes’ conception of the mind 
as ‘seated’ in the body and, since the 20th century, the ‘computer metaphor’ for thought 
have been the defining influences in thinking about the mind in the West. We might 
understand these metaphors as underscoring a conception of the mind as being internal in 
some way. Thus, though there is no customary or standard view of the mind to which most 
Western philosophers refer, what I am conceiving of as the traditional picture might be 
distinguished by the idea that human cognition—whatever it is that humans do when they 
think, which leads then to action—is a thing that happens inside human brains and nowhere 
else. It is principally grounded in structures bound by the skin and skull. 
                                                            
4
 The term ‘cognitive ecology’ is owed to work by philosopher of cognitive science Edwin Hutchins. 
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Rob Wilson (2004) helpfully lays out two theses that formalize the assumptions of 
the traditional picture. As he states, for any psychological function or ability, X,
5
 it is 
thought that, 
“Internal Richness Thesis: Structures and processes internal to the 
individual that are important to the acquisition and development of X are 
rich; and 
External Minimalism Thesis: Structures and processes external to an 
individual play at best a secondary causal role in the acquisition and 
development of X” (p. 15). 
As Wilson argues, these theses guide inquiry into human cognition on the traditional 
picture, and restrict both what kinds of explanations of our psychological capacities count 
as legitimate and where and how it is assumed that we can intervene on them.
6
 To see how 
this works, it is helpful to consider how the traditional picture, while generally taken for 
granted, has been foregrounded in recent years by efforts to reject the internalist paradigm. 
For example in his 2015 book, Talking to Ourselves, John Doris surveys a large 
portion of the philosophical literature on agency and action, drawing out what he argues is 
an implicitly relied on picture he calls reflectivism. As he writes,  
“[t]he exercise of human agency consists in judgment and behavior ordered 
by self-conscious reflection about what to think and do. In an exercise of 
agency, as construed by reflectivism, a person correctly divines the beliefs, 
desires, and other psychological states relevant to her decision, makes her 
decision in light of these states (sometimes called her reasons), and acts 
accordingly” (p. x, 2015). 
As Doris points out, we traditionally think of ourselves as guided by internal psychological 
states such as beliefs and desires, to which we have a special kind of first-personal access. 
Similarly, in his 2011 book on externalism and moral psychology, Andrew Sneddon 
characterizes what he calls the ‘general view’, that “[a]ction production mechanisms 
                                                            
5
 For example, perception, language use, moral cognition, etc. 
6
 Exactly how ‘rich’ our internal architecture is, or how ‘secondary’ our external environments are, of course, 
varies from theory to theory. 
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function in regular pattered ways with substantial independence from contextual 
contingencies” and that “[t]hat these mechanisms are in principle accessible to agents 
introspectively” (p. 184). Here, Sneddon makes explicit a corollary to this internalist 
paradigm, that ‘contextual contingencies’ such as features of our social and physical 
environments do not guide our behavior except in a contingent or accidental way. There is 
also an underappreciated normative dimension to the concept of human agency, that to be 
a rational agent, one ought to reason by inspecting the contents of one’s mind and using 
internal principles to make decisions based on these contents. For example, in their (2004) 
paper on rationality Richard Samuels and Stephen Stich remark that,  
“[t]hough researchers in this area rarely offer an explicit and general 
normative theory of rationality, we think that most authors tacitly adopt 
some version of what Edward Stein has called the “Standard Picture” of 
rationality: According to this picture, to be rational is to reason in 
accordance with principles of reasoning that are based on rules of logic, 
probability theory and so forth… [these] are the principles we ought to 
reason in accordance with (Stein 1996, 4)”. 
Questioning the internal richness and external minimalism theses, as we will see 
that Wilson himself does, has been a large part of the work of philosophers like Doris, and 
Sneddon. Influenced by the rapid growth of the sciences of the mind and human behavior 
in the past few decades, this ‘ecological turn’ takes many forms, but the common thread is a 
rejection of the skin and skull as essential boundaries of the mind, along with, to a lesser 
orgreater extent depending on the theorist, a rejection of broadly ‘nativist’ claims about 
cognition.
7
 These arguments are the focus of the next section. 
1.2 Making the Ecological Turn 
                                                            
7
 I have in mind here a wide swath of views, including not only the semantic externalism of Putnam (1975), 
Burge (1979), and Fodor (1987, 1994), and Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) more radical extended mind thesis, but 
the development of other ‘externalist’ ideas in philosophy of mind in Dennett (2003), Wilson, (2004), Clark 
(2007), Shapiro (2007) and Ismael (2007). Other thinkers take cues from evolutionary anthropology, 
emphasizing the importance of social learning and cultural information for human cognition, such as 
Sterelny’s (2003, 2012) niche construction theory, and gene culture co-evolutionary theory as presented in 
Richerson and Boyd (2005), Boyd and Richerson (2005), and Henrich (2011). A third strain of thought looks 
at the effects of situational features and environmental structures on moral cognition in particular, for 




Arguments for rejecting the traditional picture in favor of one that sees human cognition as 
intimately integrated into our bodies and worlds have appeared in many different forms. 
Here, I will focus on a few that will help us get a better grasp on just what the ecological 
picture is, and what it means for thinking about the capabilities and limits of the mind. To 
start, the arguments I am interested in can be usefully sorted into three distinct flavors. 
First, there are evolutionary arguments that examine the anthropological record and 
evolutionary theory as a source of evidence for thinking of human cognition as essentially 
environmentally situated. Next, there are insightful arguments in philosophy of mind that 
question some of the metaphysical commitments of traditional views. These arguments 
may, in fact, underlie much ecologically-minded thinking. Finally, there are arguments that 
use recent empirical work in social psychology and applied cognitive science to show that 
the traditional picture is incompatible with facts about how humans think and act. 
After examining each of these arguments in turn, I will spell out the ecological 
picture in more detail, and go on to show how it has influenced recent theorizing about 
human cognition.  
 
1.2.1 Evolutionary Arguments 
A recurrent puzzle in the behavioral sciences concerns the question of human uniqueness—
explaining how we exhibit complex social features such as large scale cooperation and 
language use, and how we, unlike other species, have been able to adapt to such diverse 
environments worldwide. As more and more of our internal cognitive endowments are 
revealed to be shared in common with non-human animals, many long standing theories 
purporting to explain human uniqueness have fallen out of favor, such as the proposal that 
non-human animals lack sentience (Low, 2012). Still, the idea that there are some features 
of our psychological nature that are distinctively human has remained. Which, if any, are 
they? 
In their influential defense of the gene-culture coevolutionary hypothesis, Robert 
Boyd and Peter Richerson suggest that the right answer to this puzzle involves thinking not 
just about how we have evolved as biological organisms, but how our cultural environments 
have evolved with us, and how these two evolutionary processes have mutually influenced 
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each other. In their book Not by Genes Alone, Boyd and Richerson argue that culture
8
 is 
part of biology, an essential human adaptation subject to similar evolutionary processes as 
our genes (2005). Three theses comprise this view. First, that our capacity to generate 
cumulative cultures across generations is itself an adaptation; in other words, as Boyd and 
Richerson show, it was at some point advantageous for us to acquire the capacity to 
transmit and store cultural information, both in our brains and environments. Second, that 
culture itself evolves; our tools, norms, and customs change in response to selective 
pressures. Third, that genes and culture coevolve; they mutually and inextricably 
influencing each other over time (Boyd & Richerson, 2005).  
According to the gene-culture coevolutionary view, then, what is unique to human 
psychological nature is not merely an excess of the kind of sophisticated intelligence that 
underlies abstract reasoning and problem solving in individuals, as this is insufficient to 
explain our species’ success. Rather, it is the accumulation of information in human 
cultures which has allowed us to thrive. By way of example, Boyd and Richerson, along 
with Joe Henrich, have this to say about difficulties humans face in the Central Arctic: 
“To stay warm and get enough to eat, you have to know how to make and 
use clothes, snow houses, lamps, harpoons, leisters, and bows. We have 
omitted other crucial tools like kayaks, dog sleds, and sun goggles, and of 
course, we have had to omit most of the details necessary to make and use 
the tools we did mention. Moreover, there is still much more you have to 
know to stay alive. Predicting storms, understanding the habits of game 
species, making baskets, building sledges, and managing dogs—all require 
extensive knowledge. Traveling on ice is essential, but also treacherous, and 
there is much to know about how the current temperature, recent weather, 
and the color and texture of the ice tell you where and when it is safe to 
travel…” (p. 3, 2011). 
Even given ‘superior’ abstract intelligence, Boyd et al. show, no individual could plausibly 
acquire all of the knowledge necessary to survive these conditions without culture and high-
                                                            
8
 In Boyd and Richersons’ sense, ‘culture’ is “information capable of affecting individual’s behavior that they 
acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social 
transmission” (p. 5, 2005). I will follow their use of the term here. 
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fidelity cultural learning to rely on (2011). Indeed, many of the tools mentioned above 
could only be perfected by the accumulation of small improvements over generations. As 
Boyd et al. write, “[e]ven experts lack a detailed causal understanding of the tools and 
techniques that permit them to survive” (p. 7, 2011). If there is anything unique about 
human psychological nature, those mechanisms that drive cultural learning undergird it.  
Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich themselves are explicitly ecologically minded, in that 
they understand this view as an alternative to views of the evolution of human cognition 
with more nativist and modular tendencies, like those held by John Tooby, Leda 
Cosmides, Steven Pinker and others.
9
 The ‘cognitive niche’, Boyd et al. claim, is more 
usefully thought of as a cultural niche (p. 2, 2011). If they are right, and human minds are 
deeply reliant on human culture, the internal richness and external minimalism theses are 
immediately called into question—the acquisition and development of many of our 
cognitive capacities relies on external structures. Looking outside the skin and skull, at how 
human cultures differentially affect human beings worldwide, is necessary to fully explain 
uniquely human psychological abilities, and how they have evolved. 
Kim Sterelny is another thinker with even more radical anti-nativist and anti-
modular views. According to his scaffolded mind hypothesis, “[h]uman cognitive capacities 
both depend on and have been transformed by environmental resources” (Sterelny, p. 472, 
2010). While Boyd and Richerson suggest that some domain-specific modules
10
 might be 
required for individuals to exercise cultural learning, Sterelny’s view proposes a more bare-
bones picture of our innate endowment that employs mostly domain-general mechanisms. 
The scaffolding which structures our learning environments and epistemic niches supplies 
the cognitive structure which our innate endowment lacks. 
In his 2003 book, Thought in a Hostile World, Sterelny argues that cultural 
learning itself is a result of the unusual confluence of several evolutionary mechanisms that 
themselves have an ecological character. These are cooperation, or mutually beneficial 
group actions with conspecifics, cumulative niche construction, the active structuring of the 
physical, social, and epistemic environment both for intra and intergenerational benefit, 
                                                            
9
 Of course, these thinkers do not deny the importance of cultural learning, just as Boyd et al. do not deny the 
importance of abstract thinking (2011). The dispute is over how much each mechanism can explain human 
variation. 
10
 Like, perhaps, a ‘theory of mind’ module for interpreting the behavior of others (Boyd & Richerson, 2005). 
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and phenotypic plasticity, particularly our capacity to absorb the vastly different 
psychological processes traits, or capacities depending on varying developmental 
environments (Sterelny 2003; 2010). While none of these traits are unique to humans, 
together they have bootstrapped human evolution in such a way that has produced our 
distinctively human psychological nature. As hominids evolved to become more 
cooperative, the story goes, this increased the benefit of both niche construction and 
plasticity, and so on. Each mechanism in turn compounds the fitness of the other 
mechanisms, creating a positive feedback loop that has reduced the role of our genetic 
endowment (2003). The scaffolded mind hypothesis thus implies that a profound shift 
should be taken away from the traditional picture of the human mind by walking further 
away than Boyd and Richerson from the notion that internal structures must be ‘rich’ or 
external ones ‘secondary’ (Sterelny, 2010). Our innately specified structures are simply not 
enough to explain our cognitive capacities. 
 
1.2.2 Arguments by Metaphysical Hypothesis 
Of course, one can take many evolutionary insights onboard without giving up on the 
traditional picture. It might be maintained—rejecting the letter of Boyd et al. and Sterelny’s 
views about what psychological components are native to the human mind, if not the taste 
of their evolutionary perspective—that when these theories make recourse to things ‘outside 
the individual’, such as our bodies, niches, or cultures, they should be interpreted as 
making claims about the proximate causes of human behavior rather than about how 
cognition is constituted. This shifts the debate to a question about the boundaries of the 
mind. Culture is important, the thought goes, but that’s just not where minds are realized; 
minds are realized in brains. If this case can be made, then accepting the gene-culture 
coevolutionary hypothesis or the scaffolded mind hypothesis need not entail that one reject 
the internal richness and external minimalism theses. This move is reminiscent of the now 
familiar coupling-constitution fallacy in philosophy of mind (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).
11
 
In his book, Boundaries of the Mind, Wilson notes that many theorists do indeed 
view cognition in this way. As he argues, this is because both individuals and their study are 
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 According to this fallacy, ecologically minded thinkers are prone to jumping from the claim that two systems 
x and y are coupled to each other, to the claim that x and y are parts of a larger system, z. 
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disciplined in the Foucauldian sense by smallism in Western science, the idea that good 
explanations of complex phenomena appeal to the proper parts they can be divided into.
12
 
(p. 25, 2004). As he writes, 
“[t]he governing assumption… is that the psychological abilities of interest 
are those that can be assessed by probing an individual in abstraction from 
not only her real life, social environment, but from any substantial social 
environment… underwritten by the search for heritable biological factors 
governing cognition… One reason… sometimes offered by psychologists 
themselves in conversation, is that is just what psychological abilities are: 
they are dispositions that individuals carry around with them from situation 
to situation” (Wilson, p. 44, 2004; italics added). 
Because psychological states are thought to supervene on physical states of the brain, then, 
brain states are thought to exhaustively constitute cognitive phenomena. In other words, a 
foundational part of the traditional picture concerns methodological individualism, the 
thesis that psychological states should be understood “without reference to anything 
beyond the boundary of the individual who has those states” (p. 10, 2004).13 
Obviously, that the sciences of the mind trend this way by custom is no argument in 
support of individualism. We might well think, like Boyd et al., Sterelny, Wilson, and 
others, that at least some interesting psychological abilities, even when they belong to 
individuals, are not bounded by them. This would be a more ecologically-minded move. 
Ultimately, then, the traditional and ecological pictures make irreconcilable metaphysical 
claims about where the mind is located and how its parts should be taxonomized. Either 
cognitive systems reach into the body and world, or they are restricted to the brain, but not 
both. This suggests a way in which we can discriminate between the two possibilities, 
namely by assessing which metaphysical commitments are most plausible. If the 
metaphysical assumptions of the traditional view are for some reason suspect, this would 
provide reasons to favor an ecological picture.  
                                                            
12
 Wilson defines smallism as “discrimination in favor of the small”, as for example, cells can be explained by 
their chemical substances, chemicals by their atoms, atoms by their subatomic particles and so on. 
13
 In Wilson’s terminology, those who deny individualism are externalists (p. 10, 2004). 
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Larry Shapiro, in his book The Mind Incarnate, questions two such traditional 
metaphysical commitments; the separability thesis and the multiple realizability thesis 
(2004). According to the separability thesis, the mind is a fairly self-contained organ that 
can basically be understood without reference to the body. According to the multiple 
realizability thesis, minds can be realized in many different kinds of brains, as whatever 
constitutes a brain also constitutes a mind. Each of these claims stem from a functional 
conception of the mind, where what makes something a mental state depends on its 
functional role in the system of which it is a part.
14
 While one could easily make 
functionalist claims about the mind without restricting themselves to the brain, these theses 
are traditional in character because they do just that, seeing the mind as a sort of resident of 
the skull. 
In questioning separability and multiple realizability, Shapiro marshals evidence 
from a number of roboticists and neuroscientists engaged in understanding and replicating 
actual human cognitive mechanisms. As these researchers show, much of our complex 
cognition, such as vision and bipedal motion
15
, is significantly embodied; it crucially relies 
on the body to process information. Because it provides constraints on the shape of 
cognition, Shapiro argues, the human body is more thoroughly integrated with the mind 
than would make sense if separability were true. The actual physical arrangement of the 
body and its connections to the brain are necessary elements of the information processing 
system. Multiple realizability, in turn, is significantly less likely because the shape of the 
physical brain at a neural level provides similar constraints (2004). If the embodiment 
hypothesis is correct, then contrary to the external minimalism thesis, structures and 
processes external to the skull indeed play a primary causal role for many psychological 
abilities. We must make reference to things outside the skull in order to even understand 
                                                            
14
 As it is with many other ecologically-minded arenas, the debate between classic computationalism and the 
embodiment hypothesis in philosophy of mind, uses slightly different terminology than I use here. As I 
summarize Shapiro and others I will continue to use the terms ‘traditional’ and ‘ecological’ in order to help 
situate different views with respect to each other, and with respect to the traditional and ecological pictures. 
15
 Unfortunately there is little time to examine this research here. For more see Shapiro (2004), especially his 
discussions of David Marr’s theory of vision, and Rodney Brooks’ work with passive-dynamic walkers. 
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what human psychological abilities are.
16
 That is to say, the traditional view makes dubious 
ontological commitments based on the evidence Shaprio presents.  
Wilson makes a similar point, in his discussion of what it means for something to 
be realized. To put it simply, for a system S to realize a property P, the state of S we refer 
to must be metaphysically sufficient for producing or sustaining P. Viewed in this way, 
human cognition is ‘widely’ realized; the computational systems under investigation in the 
cognitive sciences extend beyond the boundaries of the body, as the components internal 
to the skull are insufficient to produce P (2001; 2003; 2004).
17
 Because they are so located, 
Wilson argues, the boundaries we draw around cognition should reflect this
18—unless there 
can be found “a plausible, non-question-begging way to individuate mental states 
independent of their total realizations” (p. 179, 2004).19
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 Wilson provides a nice example of this way of thinking in his discussion of enactive representation, saying, 
“[r]epresentation is not something implanted in individuals but something that individuals do by exploiting 
the rich structures of their environments in cycles of perception and action” (p. 178, 2004). For an excellent 
treatise on taking this dynamic stance in cognitive science, see Chemero (2009). 
17
 Zach Murphy has recently posited a novel and rigorous method for drawing boundaries around the mind 
which plausibly extend beyond the body (Murphy, 2015). According to his Extended Scaffolded Mind (ESM) 
thesis, scaffolding (understood as a more general notion than Sterelny’s above) “is the relationship holding 
between two processes p1 and p2 such that when p1 scaffolds p2, p1 eases p2's processing demands” 
(Murphy, p. 35, 2015). Using graph theory, we can chart the density scaffolding between any two processes. 
Murphy then proposes that a process should be understood as part of a cognitive system “if the scaffolding it 
contributes is not significantly divergent from the average [density of the system] being considered before its 
inclusion” (p. 41, 2015). Murphy argues that, using his method, tools such as neuroprostheses are proper 
parts of individual minds (2015). 
18
 For an intermediary view, see Rupert (2009). 
19
 The mistake the traditional picture seems to make here is in thinking that because cognitive systems are 
widely realized, individuals must be as well. But this misses an important distinction between subjects and 
systems. Systems, like of digestion or cognition, should be construed widely, as parts of these processes 
‘extend into the world.’ Subjects on the other hand—the bearers or loci of the properties or processes—need 
not be construed widely. Writes Wilson, “[i]n both species of externalism that I have discussed, the individual 
remains the subject or bearer of psychological states even if she no longer serves as a boundary demarcating 
the entities of a respectable psychological science” (p. 212, 2004). 
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1.2.3 Empirical Arguments 
Leaving aside both theory and the ancestral environment, how do contemporary human 
beings actually think and act? Does anything about our observable behavior suggest that the 
internal richness and external minimalism theses might be true? Some of the most 
suggestive evidence for making the ecological turn comes from a flood of behavioral studies 
investigating what is known as ‘dual process’ theories of cognition, according to which our 
behavior is guided by two separate and often conflicting systems of cognition known by the 
somewhat tongue-in-check names System 1 and System 2. On the dual process picture, 
System 1 is fast, tacit, automatic, intuitive and unreflective, generating quick judgments and 
actions based on heuristics and expert skills, while System 2 is slow, deliberate, and 
controlled, producing the kinds of judgments associated with abstract reasoning 
(Kahneman, 2011).  
Of course, it seems perfectly reasonable, and not at all inconsistent with the 
traditional picture that we should rely on System 1 at times. If we froze up and slowly 
reasoned through the process of tying our shoes or choosing from all 60 kinds of breakfast 
cereal at the supermarket, we would not be very effective creatures.  But people rely on 
System 1 much more often than might be expected. According to many philosophers, the 
dual process literature reveals that humans do not generally behave in ways reflective of 
deliberate, self-conscious, and principled reasoning. Quite the opposite is true. Minor 
situational factors, priming effects, and implicit biases in perception and evaluation seem to 
order much of our behavior. This creates trouble for the traditional picture, because 
behaviors representative of agency are supposed to be those guided by conscious internal 
reflection on our psychological states. 
Worse, when it comes to tacit, quick thinking decisions procedures, we can harbor 
implicit irrationalities as easily as we can harbor justified heuristics and decision 
procedures.
20
 In fact, System 1 cognition often guides action in strange, dissociative ways 
that come apart from explicitly endorsed beliefs. The Name Letter Effect, for example, 
makes more likely that ‘Georgina’ moves to Georgia, and ‘Dennis’ becomes a dentist, than 
anyone else (Nuttin, 1987), the Watching Eyes Effect makes it more likely that people do 
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 For an extended treatment of this idea, see Brownstein (ms). 
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the right thing, even when they know for a fact that they are not being observed, by the 
blatant placement of images of eyes (Haley & Fessler, 2005), and Implicit Racial Bias 
influences even avowed egalitarians to judge resumes headed by ‘black-sounding’ names 
much harsher than those headed by ‘white-sounding’ names (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 
2003).
21
 Subjects in these studies do not cite these effects as causal influences on their 
behavior, but rather give explanations that make recourse to traditional, internal decision 
making procedures. (Doris, 2002).  
As Doris puts it, “[t]he empirical literature indicates that evidence of incongruence 
is readily obtained across a wide variety of experimental protocols… taken together, these 
observations make plausible the supposition that incongruence is widespread in everyday 
life” (p. 61, 2015). He argues that this incongruence, the conflict between how we explain 
our behavior and its actual causal antecedents, undermines the exercise of agency. Again, 
as Sneddon argues, the pervasive influence of external features of our environments “does 
not imply that beliefs, desires, and other proattitudes do not produce actions, but it does 
imply that they alone do not produce actions” (p. 186, 2011). Indeed, it is hard to reconcile 
this picture with the internal richness and external minimalism theses, as it suggests that our 
cognition is for the most part driven by things outside the skull. One radical response to 
this would be to conclude, as some do, that human beings just aren’t (or maybe are hardly 
ever) agents in the traditional sense.
22
 But this is hardly necessary. Instead, as both Doris 
and Sneddon argue, we should be motivated to endorse an approach to cognition and 
agency that fits comfortably with the ecological picture. 
 
1.3 The Ecological Picture 
Though it runs under various names like Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and 
Affective (4ae) cognition, ‘externalism’ with respect to the mind, or as Wilson calls it the 
Temporally Extended, Scaffolded, and Embodied and Embedded (TESSE) view, 
ecological thinking has influenced recent theories of human cognition in many domains. 
And as is perhaps already clear, it has enjoyed an increasing influence in philosophy of 
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 This literature is huge. For an excellent summary, see Doris (2002; 2015). 
22
 For example see Merritt (2000) or Ross (2002). 
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mind. The most eloquent summation of the ecological picture, in my view, comes from the 
work of philosopher Andy Clark. In his 2007 paper, “Soft-Selves and Ecological Control”, 
he writes: 
“[h]umans belong to the interesting class of what I'd like to call open-ended 
ecological controllers. These are systems that seem to be specifically 
designed so as to constantly search for opportunities to make the most of 
body and world, checking for what is available, and then (at various time-
scales and with varying degrees of difficulty) integrating it deeply, creating 
whole new unified systems of distributed problem-solving... in fact, human 
agents seem highly engineered so as to be able quite generally to learn to 
make maximal problem-simplifying use of an open-ended variety of 
internal, bodily, or external sources of order. For example, we can learn to 
use tools, sports racquets, and musical instruments in ways that exploit the 
intrinsic dynamics of those material structures” (p. 103, 2007). 
In other words, human beings are ecological agents. Ecological control is the kind of 
control we exert, according to Clark, that, 
“allows much of our skill at walking to reside in the linkages and elastic 
properties of muscles and tendons. And it allows (I claim) much of our 
prowess at thought and reason to depend upon the robust and reliable 
operation, often (but not always) in dense brain-involving loops, of a variety 
of non-biological problem-solving resources spread throughout our social 
and technological surround” (p. 101, 2007). 
Rather than micro-managing every detail of our action, our minds are uniquely 
suited to create, calibrate, and exploit these loops of influence through our bodies and 
worlds in the service of achieving personal goals, even though ecological control “is 
devolved, distributed, diffuse, decentralized, often smeared out over time, and typically not 
accompanied by the kind of rich consciousness awareness characteristic of higher level and 
reflective cognition” (Holroyd & Kelly, forthcoming). It is agency in the realest sense. To 
be a well-functioning agent is to successfully manage one’s cognitive ecology. 
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In the remainder of section one I would like to briefly illustrate and elaborate on 
the ecological picture using several recent philosophical projects that apply this perspective 
to more specific areas of human cognition. The key idea will be to highlight three domains 
over which ecological action of the type that Clark emphasizes is crucial to our 
psychological well-functioning: our bodies, our social environments, and our physical 
worlds. Taking ecological action to manipulate these arenas facilitates fluent and flexible 
goal pursuit. This will prepare us for understanding actual therapeutic techniques in 
ecological terms. 
 
(1) We are embodied agents.—Ecological control over the body perhaps needs the least 
elaboration, as much that is important to this domain is discussed alongside the 
embodiment hypothesis. One thing that has not yet been mentioned, however, is how 
we might deliberately shape our bodies, for example as basketball players train to 
offload deliberate thinking about their jump shots, or nearsighted people may elect to 
surgically reshape the lenses of their eyes to see more clearly. Fringe cases of this may 
include the additions to our bodies, such as cochlear implants, deep-brain stimulation 
devices, or even implants which extend our sensory perception to, for example, parts of 
the non-visible light spectrum, or magnetic fields. 
(2) We are mindshapers.—In Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human 
Social Cognition, Tad Zawidzki argues that one of the ‘lynchpins’ underlying humans’ 
unique sociocognitive nature is our array of mindshaping mechanisms; those 
mechanisms which drive imitation, pedagogy, irresistible conformism, norm institution, 
enforcement, and narrative and self-constitution. On his picture, “[a]ny mechanism the 
proper functioning of which is getting a target mind to match a model in certain 
respects counts as mindshaping” (p. xvi, 2013). We are constantly aiming to get 
ourselves and others to think and act in desirable ways. 
The idea that individuals are continuously involved in mindshaping has many 
interesting implications. For one, as Sneddon notes, there is an important sense in 
which we literally share psychological processes with other people, insofar as we 
participate in wide cognitive systems (p. 23, 2011). These scaffolding systems establish 
norms of behavior in our social niches, by simultaneously interpreting and regulating 
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how others act (Zawidzki, p. xiii, 2013). But they do not do so uniformly. For an 
individual to exert ecological control in their social niches, then, may be as simple as 
teaching a young child the rules of sharing toys. On the other hand, it may be as 
complex as dealing with a traffic violation while travelling abroad. As Sneddon puts it, 
“[o]ur moral minds are psychologically heterogeneous in part because they are 
significantly widely realized and the world in which we operate is heterogeneous” (p. 
204, 2011). 
(3) We are environmental scaffolders.—In developing his scaffolded mind view, Sterelny 
has much to say about how developmental environments are engineered by preceding 
generations (2012). Everything from the stories we tell, to the toys we make available, to 
the playgrounds and schools we design contains a wealth of information for our 
children to absorb on their way to adulthood. But there are also everyday ways that 
individuals manage their environments to reduce epistemic burdens and improve 
cognitive performance. The ways we organize our kitchens (knives below the counter, 
cups above the sink), media (my albums are grouped by genre then alphabetized by 
artist name), and tools (ever wonder why keyboards are arranged ‘qwerty’-wise?) all 
significantly reduce the costs of routine tasks. Imagine what life would be like if streets 
weren’t numbered sequentially, if clocks weren’t synchronized, if pharmacies weren’t 
reliably marked, or if you had to wander through the grocery store looking item by item 
for the location of the Macintosh apples. Of course, many of these systems are already 
in place in the environments young humans are born into, but many others have 
emerged recently as solutions to novel problems (I am sure we all remember a time 
before we could seek information on trending news topics by using ‘hashtags’).Thinking 
of ecological control over the environment as cultural scaffolding is important, then, as 
many of the systems we employ are replications of or improvements on systems used 
by our ancestors (How long, for instance, have we been using some version of the 
decimal counting system?). 
 
2. Stewards of the Mind 
As anyone who has ever tried to kick a habit or start a new routine already knows, changing 





 Taking an ecological perspective on human cognition and agency is 
revelatory as to why: both the tools at one’s disposal and the object of ones efforts are part 
of a complex cognitive system that extends beyond the boundaries of the individual. Using 
your mind to change your mind is not necessarily—or even principally—an inwardly focused 
process. Viewed this way, the kind of control individuals have over their own minds is 
‘indirect’; it is a process of managing cognitive ecology in the right way, shaping cognitive 
resources beyond those internal to the skin and skull, shaping our bodies, our social 
environments, and our physical worlds. Especially in a therapeutic context, then, it is useful 
to see an individual’s role in managing her mental health as one of stewardship, a 
responsible planning and management of cognitive ecology that benefits her mental well-
being.  
Before elaborating on this idea it will be beneficial to lay some groundwork. First, 
in 2.1 I will briefly situate the ecological perspective in the literature on philosophy of 
psychiatry by saying a little about what is meant by terms like ‘mental health’ and ‘mental 
illness’. In 2.2, I will articulate how an ecological perspective can inform the ‘recipe for 
change’ in psychiatric therapy, by demonstrating how various therapeutic techniques can be 
understood as tools of ecological control. I will introduce a key piece of terminology, 
agential technology, to refer to these kinds of tools. Finally, in 2.3 I will consider one 
potential objection to my view, which questions whether psychiatric therapy as it is 
practiced in the real world really needs an ecological reorientation. 
 
2.1 An Ecological Understanding of Therapy 
To start with a practical definition, the World Health Organization calls mental 
health “a state of complete mental well-being, and not merely the absence of disease… 
related to the promotion of well-being, the prevention of mental disorders, and the 
treatment and rehabilitation of people affected by mental disorders” (WHO, 2015). Of 
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 My favorite critique of this phenomenon comes from comedian Dave Chappelle on the popular self-help 
book The Secret, which apparently claims that the one solution to getting what you want from life is ‘positive 
thinking’. “Fly to Africa and try telling one of them starving children that…” Chappelle jokes, “What you need 
to do is visualize some roast beef and some mashed potatoes and gravy… the problem is you have a bad 
attitude about starving to death!” (Chappelle, 2007). By relying on the traditional picture, these views can 




course, ‘complete mental well-being’ might be setting the bar a little high for most, but this 
definition at least makes sense of the idea that even those not suffering from a particular 
mental disorder might improve upon their psychological well-being. Promoting mental 
health is as much about managing day-to-day stress as it is about preventing psychosis—one 
can be healthy, and still might be healthier. I mean ‘being mentally ill’, then, to describe a 
condition in which an individual's flourishing significantly impaired or limited by some 
features of their psychology irrespective of what those features are.
24
 
Therapeutic intervention in psychiatry is any measure taken to intervene on an individual’s 
cognitive system and improve their well-being. Psychiatric therapy is ecological in nature 
because the boundary of the mentally ill subject's cognitive system goes beyond the 
individual—changes to the physical body, and the social and environmental niches are all 
ways to effect that cognitive system.
25
 Still, we need not worry that we might be applying 
terms like ‘mental illness’ in strange and objectionable ways, as long as mental illness 
remains a property of individuals and not of cognitive systems. That is to say, the mentally 
ill subject is the person I can point to on the therapist's couch, because they are the locus of 
the mental illness. There is no making sense of pointing to, say, a broken educational 
system or despotic government and saying ‘there’s mental illness here’. Further, 
determining the health of someone's mental condition should be done with respect to that 
individual’s well-being and nothing else. 
 
2.2 Agential Technologies  
From an ecological perspective on psychiatric therapy, therapeutic techniques are best 
conceived of as a species of agential technologies; a set of often non-obvious methods and 
strategies of control, whose pathway of influence over behavior and psychological 
functioning often loops outside the boundaries of the skin and skull. In what follows I will 
first say more about agential technologies in general, following Jules Holroyd and Dan 
Kelly’s discussion of forms of ecological control in their forthcoming paper, “Implicit Bias, 
Character, and Control”. I will then explain how therapeutic interventions specifically are 
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 For a detailed discussion on how these terms are used here and in the literature, see previous chapters. 
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 As will be demonstrated in great detail in section 3. 
81 
 
of this kind—technologies of mental health—by surveying some contemporary methods for 
improving psychological well-being. 
 
2.2.1 The General Picture 
In their insightful elaboration of Clark’s concept of ecological control, Holroyd and Kelly 
note that there is an ambiguity in the idea of exerting ecological control that has not yet 
been explored. Exerting ecological control might mean taking ecological control by, for 
instance, purposefully organizing the files on your desktop. This puts a tool into place that 
you can rely on at a later date in an exercise of ecological control (Holroyd & Kelly, 
forthcoming). In the first case, you are co-opting your environment, using your lauded 
system 2 skills in abstract reasoning and planning to structure your ecological niche. In the 
second case, you are relying on previously deployed structure in order to bring your 
behavior in line with your goals without the need for system 2 effort. As Holroyd and Kelly 
put it, “[u]ltimately, a person can calibrate sub-systems that guide behavior until eventually 
they operate, on their own, in precisely the way she wants them to operate, even when she 
is not consciously and explicitly attending to them” (forthcoming).  
These tools, structures, or subsystems which human beings create in taking 
ecological control, and use in exercising it, are those previously mentioned ‘brain-involving 
loops of influence’. They may recruit social, biological, or non-biological resources. They 
can be as transparent to the user as a well-organized file system, but they may also work in 
opaque and non-obvious ways—like an expert golf swing learned through imitation, or a 
solution to a problem like implicit bias that must be discovered by careful empirical 
research. Resources which exploit these loops are technologies of agency, supporting goal 
directed cognition and behavior in situations where our internal resources may not be 
enough. 
Elaborating on their taking/exercising distinction, Holroyd and Kelly describe three 
noteworthy kinds of agential technologies. First, there are ‘environmental props consciously 
employed for guiding cognitive control’ (hereafter, environmental props). Deploying 
environmental props is a way to take ecological control from the outside in, by making use 
of environmental scaffolding and mindshaping. For example one can significantly weaken 
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implicit racial biases by surrounding oneself with images of admired exemplars of the 
stigmatized group, such as Billie Holiday and Malcom X (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). 
The images are environmental props. Next, there are ‘cognitive props consciously 
employed for guiding cognitive processes’ (hereafter, embodied props). Embodied props 
are a way of taking ecological control by shaping one’s own mind to indirectly guide 
behavior at a later time from the inside out. To take the case of implicit prejudice again, the 
use of implementation intentions has recently been shown to be an effective strategy for 
managing the effects of implicit bias. As Holroyd and Kelly summarize, an individual 
“might deliberately repeat to herself 'if I see a Black face, I will think ‘safe,’' practising this 
line of thought enough that it becomes routine and automatic, thus defeating her implicit 
racial bias” (see also: Webb, Sheeran, & Pepper 2010). An implementation intention is an 
embodied prop. Finally there are ‘automatic processes as props unconsciously employed 
for guiding cognitive processes’ (hereafter, embodied habits). Embodied habits are those 
internal processes that allow one to guide behavior without having to actively take 
ecological control. For instance, it has been shown that one’s commitment to egalitarian 
goals, thankfully, mitigates the influence of implicit bias at least somewhat (see also: 
Moskowitz & Li 2011). Egalitarian goals themselves, as automatically activated structures in 
one’s cognitive ecology, can be thought of as an agential technologies as well (Holroyd & 
Kelly, forthcoming). 
To these three kinds, environmental props, embodied props, and embodied habits, 
I would like to add a fourth kind of agential technology that might be usefully employed in 
guiding behavior. What I’ll call cultural customs are ways we automatically guide our 
behavior from the outside in using extant structures in our social environments and 
physical worlds. We are born into niches with all kinds of useful scaffolding, both for 
developing into competent adults, and for remaining competent through our lifetimes. To 
take a rather tired example, consider all of the infrastructure in the United States that 
supports driving on the right side of the road. Of course, there is no reason why the entire 
citizenry of the state of Illinois couldn’t agree tomorrow that left-sided driving suits them 
better. As long as everyone was doing it, left-sided driving would be no better or worse 
efficiency and safety wise than right-sided driving… except for one thing. All of the road 
paint, traffic signs, and other signals we rely on to direct us—especially when we are perhaps 
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not being completely attentive—are engineered for driving on the right. The sheer scale of 
effort it would take to reorganize all of this infrastructure makes the switch infeasible. This 
infrastructure is an important agential technology, a method of controlling our behavior 
that relies on things external to the skin and skull. 
With the addition of cultural customs, it becomes clear how agential technologies 
can be categorized simultaneously by domain and by the taking/exercising distinction. In 
figure 1, I have organized the four types of agential technologies in a matrix. Along the x-
axis, they are categorized by instances of consciously taking versus automatically exercising 
ecological control. Along the y-axis, they are categorized by the domain of ecological 
action; action over the body, or ‘inside out’, and over the non-bodily, physical or social 
environment, or ‘outside in’. In what follows, I will examine how a number of 
contemporary therapeutic techniques fit into this matrix. 
 
2.2.1 Technologies of Mental Health 
The goal of this section is to motivate the stewardship picture by interpreting contemporary 
therapeutic techniques as agential technologies. The categories are meant merely as helpful 
partitions in the current landscape. 
 
(1) Villages—One longstanding method of mental health management and care involves 
finding habitats and social circles that facilitate well-being, whether by fostering solitude 
or community, eliminating risks or dangers, reducing or increasing stimulation, or 
providing specialized care. For the treatment of mental and developmental disorders in 
 
 taking EC exercising EC 
body embodied props embodied habits 
non-body environmental props cultural customs 
Figure 1: Agential Technologies 
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particular, the tradition of relocation to a better suited environment goes back at least as 
far as 700 years ago, when the town of Geel in Belgium began taking in ‘boarders’ from 
across Europe. Simply living in a safe and caring home significantly improved sufferers’ 
symptoms compared with those left in the charge of the prisons and institutions of the 
time (Jay, 2014). Hospitals, rehab facilities, and specialized schools are modern 
examples of these spaces; each institution is ideally intended to provide particular 
environmental props and customs designed for therapeutic change. In addition, some 
interested in long-term care for sufferers of Alzheimer’s and dementia have recently 
begun planning and implementing enclosed ‘villages’ and other infrastructures to 
maximize safety and independence. For example, there is a bus stop outside Benrath 
Senior Center in Düsseldorf where no busses ever stop in order to help calm potential 
wanderers (de Quetteville, 2008), and a ‘dementia-focused living center’ in Weesp, 
Holland where the apartments and shops are designed to reflect familiar times and the 
caretakers wear ‘street clothes’ (Campbell-Dollaghan, 2014). These facilities combine 
many different cultural customs in order to facilitate the well-being and self-sufficiency 





Figure 2: “Outdoor space plan for nursing home De Hogeweyk”, by Niek Roozen 
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(2) Self-help organizations—Sometimes known as ‘12 step programs’, self-help 
organizations are a source of controversy, especially in the United States, where 
programs like Alcoholics Anonymous can be religious in nature, and are often the only 
affordable option for those negotiating court-ordered treatment for substance abuse 
(Ruiz, 2014; Glaser, 2015). Research suggests that AA is not the only, or even the most 
effective treatment for addiction. Still, there are those who undeniably claim that it has 
helped them (Singal, 2015). There are likely several explanations for this. First, 
regardless of the specific program, choosing to join a social circle where members are 
committed to specific goals, like remaining sober, is an effective mindshaping 
technique. This is because having trusted mentors and sponsors, as well as having 
community members with shared experiences, are effective environmental props. 
Indeed, sociality is, in general, a powerful influence on mental health (Alexander, 
2001). Second, in addition to structuring the social environment, those in self-help 
organizations are often engaged in a kind of restructuring of their values and 
commitments, using certain creeds and rituals as embodied props to control behavior. 
Understood, on a traditional view, as a mere use of ‘willpower’ it would be mysterious 
as to why not all addicts who strive to curb their addiction are not equally successful.  
(3) Psychotherapy—Behavioral therapy, cognitive-behavioral therapy, emotion-focused and 
psychodynamic psychotherapy all follow a familiar cultural trope in the West: patient 
and therapist sit across from each other in a comfortable room, and discuss the 
patient’s mental well-being. Depending on the particular modality, there are different 
theoretical reasons for engaging in this process—discovering repressed memories and 
feelings and forging new emotional associations are just two.
26
 However, as Doris puts it, 
“[t]herapists’ theoretical predilections have relatively little to do with client outcomes, 
and the means by which therapy works are imperfectly understood” (p. 124, 2015). 
This may not come as welcome news for those seeking a ‘sure-fire cure’. From an 
ecological perspective, however, the idea that patient-therapist relationships facilitate 
positive change while not providing complete or permanent ‘cures’ for mental 
                                                            
26
 While there is confusion as to why, the current consensus seems to be that ‘talk therapy’, regardless of 
particular modality, works. For more see Lane et al. (2015), Lambert and Ogles (2004), Cozolino (2002), 
Luborsky et al. (1985), and Seligman (1993). 
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disorders is obvious. Psychotherapy does not instantaneously remove the underlying 
cause of any symptoms, but is rather one more tool in a steward of the mind’s arsenal, 
an environmental prop which may provide crucial social support. Indeed, there is good 
evidence that “a ‘positive alliance’ between therapist and client is associated with 
positive outcomes” across modalities (p. 124, Doris, 2015). Further, a therapist may 
make specific recommendations for a patient to restructure their work and home lives, 
providing additional technologies of mental health to combat particular illnesses. 
(4) Psychoactive drugs27—Modifying ones neurochemistry is an effective tool of ecological 
control for many people. As a deliberate method of reorganizing body chemistry, 
psychoactive drugs are a kind of embodied prop. Another, more recently rediscovered 
dimension to the therapeutic use of psychoactive drugs involves the guided use of 
psychedelics like LSD and psilocybin. Professor of psychiatry Rolland Griffiths 
describes this kind of therapy as a kind of “inverse PTSD”; these drugs generate 
increased connectivity in brain regions which do not normally connect for a discrete 
period of time, during which the rigid patterns of thinking that characterize addiction 
and compulsions may be disrupted and replaced (Pollan, 2015). Electing to take such a 
‘trip treatment’ is a clear way of managing cognitive ecology from the inside out. In the 
right circumstances, psychedelics are embodied props. Finally, recent research 
indicates that probiotics targeting your gut are significantly psychoactive. Not only does 
early development of the microbiome play a role in mental health, but changing gut 
bacteria in adults can significantly change behavior (Arnold, 2013). It is conceivable that 
there will be an increase in the use of probiotics as technologies of mental health in the 
future. 
(5) Recent innovations—With recent advances in surgical techniques, robotic engineering, 
and even graphics engines, a number of unconventional psychiatric interventions have 
                                                            
27
 I don’t wish to wade too deeply into the controversy surrounding the use of prescription medications, and 
the influence of the pharmaceutical industry. Elsewhere I have written about the problematic effects of 
industry on prescription practices (Washington & Morar, forthcoming). Suffice it to say that, while the impact 
of money on medicine is complex and deeply entrenched, there is no reason to think that the use of drugs 
like anti-depressants, stimulants, mood stabilizers, or even pain medications have no place in psychiatric 
therapy. In a both crude and eloquent response to a particularly virulent strain of anti-anti-depressant 
discourse in US politics, blogger John Dolan opines that, “[d]rugs in contemporary America are like 
prostitutes in Victorian Europe: Life could not go on without them, everyone depends on them one way or 
another, but no one ever thanks them. They don’t fit in with the global lie we tell about this life” (2014). 
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developed over the past few decades which are worth highlighting. To start, brain 
stimulation therapies have evolved far beyond so-called ‘electroshock’ therapy.28 Vagus 
nerve stimulation devices are currently used to treat epilepsy and mood disorders, 
electrodes placed within the brain to treat Parkinson’s disease are being studied as 
treatments for depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and transcranial magnetic 
stimulation is also being studied for depression and psychosis (NIMH, 2015). Perhaps 
more remarkable are the number of videogames in development as potential 
treatments for everything from post-traumatic stress to attention deficit disorders and 
age related-cognitive decline (Brooks, 2013; Bluestein, 2014; Couch, 2015). 
 
One thing to note about the therapeutic techniques listed so far, is that they often have a 
social or relational dimension. Perhaps you can be relied upon to take your medications by 
yourself and on schedule, but there is no therapy without a therapist, no deep brain 
stimulation without a surgeon, and no rehab facility without caretakers or supporters. This 
introduces an interesting dimension of other-directedness to therapeutic intervention. 
Sometimes we act so as to manage our own mental health but sometimes we act for others. 
Even when not actively occupying a social role like that of a clinician, human beings can 
have a substantial impact on the cognitive ecology of our fellows. 
The implication of social engineering does not strike me as particularly 
problematic. In the context of raising children for instance, such engineering is not only 
uncontroversial, but expected. The number of choices parents must make in arranging 
their child’s developmental environment for optimal mental health is astonishing, and it 
only grows as we learn more about the mind and brain. It is now speculated for instance 
that frequent school moves increase the risk for psychiatric symptoms (Singh, 2014), that 
strong adult relationships are a key ingredient in resilience (Walsh, 2015), that music 
lessons aid emotional intelligence while bilingualism reduces essentialist intuitions (Nutt, 
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 It is perhaps not well known that ectroconvulsive therapy today is still widely used, and considered a safe 




2015; Byers-Heinlein & Garcia, 2014), and that frequent use of handheld devices like 
cellphones may delay development (Lin et al., 2012; Rowan, 2015).
29
 
The point is well taken, however, that there is risk in conceiving of some other-
directed tools of ecological control as technologies of mental health. It is quite possible that 
any attempt to order another person, or group of peoples’ behavior may be detrimental 
because it is paternalist. But this should not stop us from promoting any particular 
therapeutic techniques.
30
 In my view, no process is therapeutic unless it succeeds at 
bettering its target. What is meant by ‘better’ is a fascinating topic for another time.31 
 
2.3 Theory vs. Reality 
So far, I have argued that an ecological perspective on the human mind is crucial for 
understanding the recipe for therapeutic change in clinical psychiatry. It explains that 
change occurs when one’s cognitive ecology is suitably altered. Managing cognitive ecology 
is best understood as a process of ecological control. As stewards of the mind, we manage 
and intervene on mental well-being using technologies of mental health, causally and 
functionally integrated chains of resources through which human beings act as agents in the 
management of mental health. 
When one steps away from theory and examines clinicians in the real world, 
however, there is a certain, perfectly understandable objection, not to the specific details of 
my view, but to its novelty. Of course psychiatric therapy is ecological in character, the 
thought goes, diet, exercise, work and home life are all normally addressed in many 
different therapeutic contexts. Mental health practitioners have known for years that an 
attempt to ameliorate the suffering of mental illness without also addressing these things is 
fruitless. This is already how it’s done. 
Is contemporary psychiatric therapy, in general or in part, ecologically-minded? 
This is a difficult determination to make, given the wide variety of contexts in which 
psychiatric therapies are practiced. I am doubtful that clinicians across contexts—including 
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 These studies are all extremely new and shouldn’t be accepted at face value, but I take it that the point 
remains that childrearing in a rapidly changing world is immensely complex. 
30
 For interesting perspectives on how government agencies and aid organizations can support psychological 
well-being see Coster (2014) and SAMHSA (2015). For a more conservative view see Evans (2013). 
31
 See previous chapters. 
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social workers, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and others—are of one mind on this, 
given how often particular interventions are emphasized as a ‘one true cure’ for all. 
Additionally, it is important to remember just how pervasive the traditional picture of the 
mind is in the West.
32
  
In any case, a review of the literature makes plain that psychiatric researchers, who 
often focus on mechanistic explanation for one particular diagnosis, have a kind of 
traditionalist bias. As philosophers Kari Theuer and Daniel Hartner put it,  
“[a] central aim of some current empirical research on psychiatric disorders 
is to link the clusters of symptoms listed in diagnostic manuals with the 
underlying neurobiological mechanisms that sustain the symptom clusters 
characteristic of the disorder. For example, much of the research on autism 
is directed toward uncovering the genetic, developmental, and 
neuroanatomical mechanisms that underlie the disorder in all autism cases 
or in relevant subgroups Autism is by no means unique in this regard: 
research on anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, schizophrenia, and 
many others can be similarly characterized” (Theuer & Hartner, 2015; 
italics added). 
In other words, much current research proceeds under the assumption that one causal 
pathway realized inside the brain is the all things considered underlying explanation for a 
particular kind of illness. Taking into account the significant influence that variations in an 
individual’s cognitive ecology can have casts doubt on this idea. I do not want to argue that 
intervention on a particular causal pathway without regard for others is never the best 
avenue for treatment for a particular individual, but again, this cannot be determined in 
abstraction from an individual’s context. To fully understand what the options even are, in 
any particular case, research must proceed with a wide enough focus to take the entire 
cognitive ecology into account. When searching for therapeutic interventions, it is crucial to 
keep this in mind, or else risk severe limitations on our basic understanding of what it is to 
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 In his book Trying Not to Try, Edward Slingerland makes a persuasive argument on ecological grounds 
that, when it comes to the difficulties of self-improvement, “[a] growing literature suggests that Chinese 
thinkers living more than 2000 years ago has a much more accurate picture of how people really think and 
behave than we find in recent Western philosophy or religious thought” (p. 10, 2014). 
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be mentally ill, and what to do about it.
33
 We should be wary of narrowly focused, ‘cure all’ 
therapies, as well as those which misconstrue human agency. I will expand on this idea in 
the next section of this paper. 
 
3. Learning to Be Better 
The ecological picture of the mind gives us new tools to explain the success or failure of 
prescriptions for improving psychological well-being, and to generate new and improved 
therapies. Successful prescriptions tend to add to our repertoire as stewards of the mind, 
rather than draw boundaries around it. They take into account individual’s uniquely human 
nature as embodied, and socially situated creatures. Successful prescriptions are compatible 
with the empirical findings of the sciences of the mind and human behavior.
34
 On the 
contrary, I am optimistic that broadening our understanding of psychiatry and psychiatric 
therapy along ecological lines will afford promising breakthroughs in the fight to alleviate 
suffering caused by mental illness. In 3.1 I hope to take one small step toward validating 
that optimism by showing how a number of proposals from the philosophical and 
psychological literature fare on ecological grounds. Then in 3.2, I will demonstrate how the 
stewardship view manifests itself as practical guidance and advice for individuals. 
 
3.1 Avenues toward Mental Well-Being 
Universal solutions can be as attractive as unifying explanations. In a forthcoming article in 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, for example, Raffael Kalisch, Marianne B. Müller, and 
Oliver Tüscher propose that mental health ultimately depends on a single unifying 
mechanism which protects against stress and mediates resilience, namely, the style in which 
someone evaluates and reacts to a challenge. Healthy organisms ‘make the best of things’ 
or ‘bounce back’. Kalisch et al. call this the positive appraisal style theory of resilience 
(PASTOR) account. As I have argued elsewhere, one plausible reading of PASTOR that 
remains consistent with an ecological view of cognition construes ‘positive appraisal’ as 
                                                            
33
 This is yet another place, it seems, to push a critique of contemporary research as exemplified by the DSM. 
See Hacking (2013) for a similar view. 
34
 I reject, in other words, the worry Sneddon expresses at the end of his book, that a ‘wide’ view of human 
cognition has little practical promise for therapy. 
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positive affective or psychophysiological response relative to stressor load, normalized to 
individuals’ actual performance in the face of various stimuli; a resilient organism makes 
the best of its circumstances, whether challenging or routine (Washington, 2015). For 
example, a resilient human being can shrug off negative feelings after a difficult workday, 
remain optimistic after a disappointing election result, or move on after a personal loss. 
Strengthening one’s ability to ‘make the best of it’, then, is the shape that therapy takes on 
this view. 
It is perhaps already clear how limiting this view might be in a therapeutic context. 
While it seems uncontroversial that you might be a bit more stressed out when making a 
life-altering decision such as whether or not to get married or quit your job than you would 
choosing between busy checkout lines in a crowded store, these are not the only, or even 
conceivably the most important dimensions along which stressor load varies. To put it 
plainly, not all human beings are out there making the best of the same kinds of 
circumstances. There are systemic disparities in the dangers we face, and the resources we 
have to face them. Regardless of how resilient an individual might be, it is possible that 




What Kalisch et al. seem to miss, other than the gravity of economic inequality, is 
the degree to which mental health depends on a widely realized cognitive ecology. Indeed, 
by claiming that socioenvironmental factors are merely distant influences on mental health, 
they buy into a version of the traditional picture, and blind themselves to the limits of 
positive appraisal. PASTOR, so far, has little to say about how things like environmental 
props and cultural customs can mitigate suffering caused by mental illness. 
Not all reject the therapeutic significance of social and environmental scaffolding 
however. Ulman Lindenberger and Ulrich Mayr, for instance, are two psychologists 
interested in the value of technologies designed to assist aging individuals, such as 
smartphones and ‘smart kitchens’ (2014). Noting that reliance on environmental cues 
increases as human beings age, they argue that there is a “dark side” to environmental 
                                                            
35
 In marginalized populations for whom mental health is a crucial concern, systemic inequality raises the 
magnitude of everyday environmental stressors, and limits many social support based stress-aversion strategies 
(Satcher, 2001). The most serene and resilient among us may be making the best possible lemonade out of 
life’s lemons, and still be suffering 
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support—that “this shift also comes at a cost, as the affordances of the environment 
increasingly dominate the structure and content of thought and behavior” (p. 7, 2014) and 
that “[older adults are] less capable of directing behavior in a top-down, internally regulated 
manner” (p. 12, 2014). Interestingly, Lindenberger and Mayr seem to conclude that 
environmental scaffolding is a danger that can hinder goal pursuit and engender loss of 
autonomy, by distracting older individuals from the details of a particular task (2014). 
Maintaining mental health, on their picture, is largely a matter of maintaining internal 
control. 
Of course, by proceeding under the traditionally-minded assumption that only 
internal, top-down, deliberative, reasoning results in ‘proper’ control, Lindenberger and 
Mayr overlook the fact that exercising ecological control can and does advance goal pursuit. 
From an ecological perspective, it should be no surprise that humans rely more on 
environmental cues in situations of compromised top-down control. This is exactly the 
kind of flexibility that allows fluent goal pursuit across a variety of circumstances. For 
example, as someone who often forgets about mundane tasks of day-to-day living 
(especially under the stress of deadline pressure!) I am very grateful for the to-do list 
capabilities of my phone. It gives me greater ability to pursue the goals I value, like taking a 
daily medication. When I respond to the notification charm by getting up from my desk 
and pouring a glass of water, I am exercising ecological control. Of course, if this task isn’t 
one that is personally important to you, you shouldn’t be following my phone reminders.  
Thus, while alarm over the negative influence of assistive technologies is 
unwarranted, Linendberger and Mayr do well to point out the need for caution as regards 
their design. Much, careful, empirical research and system 2 thinking is required to create 
technologies of mental health which correspond to the needs and goals of individuals, 
rather than sidetracking them. This idea highlights a feature common to many ecologically-
minded therapeutic proposals: that psychiatric therapy is, ideally, as highly individualized as 
the needs and goals of the agents who engage in it. Individual variation, especially variation 
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in cognitive ecology, entails variation in the ways we achieve, maintain, and improve mental 
health.
 36
 As philosopher Dan Haybron puts it in his book The Pursuit of Unhappiness, 
“[o]ur propensities for being happy or unhappy in various ways of living are 
important to who we are. This matters, I argue, because it seems important 
to live in accordance with who we are: well-being consists partly in fulfilling 
our emotional natures” (p. 22, 2008).37 
While not concerned with mental illness specifically, philosopher Valerie Tiberius 
also grapples with the complexities of individual variation in the process of changing 
oneself  for the better in her account of living well (2008). According to her Reflective 
Wisdom Account, a well-lived life is guided by the values which stand up to appropriate, 
first-personal reflection. Of course, these values will not necessarily be the same for every 
human being. Part of the difficulty then, which Tiberius recognizes, is not just deciding how 
to behave unreflectively according to ones values, but knowing whether or not those values 
are legitimate, or tell the whole story. To combat this, Tiberius suggests that we cultivate 
certain virtues—we must be flexible, self-aware, optimistic, and have perspective on our lives 
in order to be sure what we really value (2008). 
This argument can be easily modified to provide a recipe for therapeutic change, of 
another kind. Taking an active role in the management of one’s own mental health 
requires a similar kind of wisdom. As stewards of the mind, some knowledge of the lay of 
our cognitive ecology is critical to understanding what therapeutic techniques will have the 
greatest impact. Investigating what we should ideally know in this regard is an important 
avenue for future research, both as members of the human species, and as individuals 
embedded in locally specific cultural contexts. Some of the specifics, of course, will evolve 
over time, as our environments change and our knowledge of them expands. In the next 
section, I will take a brief look at some of the best, current advice.
                                                            
36
 I make a similar points about variation in both ways of being ill and ways of being healthy in previous 
chapters. 
37
 Interestingly, Haybron goes on to argue that there are fewer ways for human beings to live happily than one 
might intuitively think (2008). 
95 
 
3.2 Your Mental Health Niche 
From a traditional perspective, it can sometimes seem as if mentally healthy individuals are 
benefiting from equal parts wisdom and providence. Whether or not someone has or 
develops a mental disorder is often thought of as bad genes, bad karma, or bad luck. 
Dealing with misfortunes like these has also traditionally been an inward-focused process—
deep reflection, will power, and perhaps the occasional pharmaceutical drug tend to be the 
recognizable tools at hand (Saks, 2013). This is somewhat unfortunate for those with a 
practical interest in managing mental health, as it prevents many everyday methods 
uncovered by recent research from being seen as ‘real’ therapeutic techniques. 
Psychiatrist Elyn R. Saks agrees. Diagnosed with schizophrenia as a young college 
student, and frequently hospitalized for a number of subsequent years, Saks was given a 
grave prognosis. Doctors told her that she should expect not to hold a steady job. Today, 
Saks is a chaired professor at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, 
an adjunct in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of California San Diego, a 
faculty member of the New Center for Psychoanalysis, and a MacArthur genius. Interested 
in what separates high-functioning schizophrenics like her from others, Saks gathered and 
interviewed twenty subjects of diverse backgrounds, who were all educated professionals 
living with the diagnosis (Saks, 2013). In an essay called ‘Successful and Schizophrenic’, 
Saks describes these interviews in a passage worth quoting at length: 
“How had these people with schizophrenia managed to succeed in their 
studies and at such high-level jobs? We learned that, in addition to 
medication and therapy, all the participants had developed techniques to 
keep their schizophrenia at bay. For some, these techniques were cognitive. 
An educator with a master’s degree said he had learned to face his 
hallucinations and ask, ‘What’s the evidence for that? Or is it just a 
perception problem?’ Another participant said, ‘I hear derogatory voices all 
the time… you just gotta blow them off.’ 
Part of vigilance about symptoms was ‘identifying triggers’ to 
‘prevent a fuller blown experience of symptoms’, said a participant who 
works as a coordinator for a nonprofit group. For instance, if being with 
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people in close quarters for too long can set off symptoms, build in some 
alone time when you travel with friends. 
Other techniques that our participants cited included controlling 
sensory inputs. For some, this meant keeping their living space simple (bare 
walls, no TV, only quiet music), while for others it meant distracting music. 
‘I’ll listen to loud music if I don’t want to hear things,’ said a participant who 
is a certified nurse’s assistant. Still others mentioned exercise, a healthy diet, 
avoiding alcohol and getting enough sleep. A belief in God and prayer also 
played a role for some. 
One of the most frequently mentioned techniques that helped our 
research participants manage their symptoms was work. ‘Work has been an 
important part of who I am,’ said an educator in our group. ‘When you 
become useful to an organization, there’s a certain value in belonging there.’ 
This person works on the weekends too because of ‘the distraction factor’. 
In other words, by engaging in work, the crazy stuff often recedes to the 
sidelines. 
Personally, I reach out to my doctors, friends, and family whenever 
I start slipping, and I get great support from them. I eat comfort food (for 
me, cereal) and listen to quite music. I minimize all stimulation. Usually 
these techniques, combined with more medication and therapy, will make 
the symptoms pass. But the work piece—using my mind—is my best defense. 
It keeps my demons at bay. My mind, I have come to say, is both my worst 
enemy and my best friend. 
That is why it is so distressing when doctors tell their patients not to 
expect or pursue fulfilling careers. Far too often, the conventional 
psychiatric approach to mental illness is to see clusters of symptoms that 
characterize people. Accordingly, many psychiatrists hold the view that 
treating symptoms with medication is treating mental illness. But this fails to 
take into account individuals’ strengths and capabilities, leading mental 
health professionals to underestimate what their patients can hope to 
achieve in the world” (Saks, 2013). 
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To my mind, a tacit acceptance of the traditional picture, especially the external 
minimalism thesis, is largely to blame for this problem. Recall that, according to this thesis, 
structures and processes external to an individual play at best a secondary causal role in the 
development of a strong, healthy mind. Perhaps the most immediate benefit of taking an 
ecological perspective on therapy, then, is in taking advantage of its much wider set of 
practical tools and techniques. Not all of these will necessarily be effective for all 
individuals, but they apply generally enough that adding them to the common lexicon 
should be a great advantage. 
By way of demonstration, consider first the ways in which we take care of our 
physical bodies that affect our psychological well-being. It is more or less common 
knowledge that one of the best things you can do for yourself to manage stress and be more 
effective is to eat well, sleep well, exercise, and meditate (for more, see: Babyak et al., 2000; 
Dweck, 2007; De Brigard, 2015). As has already been mentioned, diet is about more than 
nutrition; it is also the way you care for the bacteria living in your gut. Recently, however, it 
has been noted that over-sterilization and use of anti-bacterial products, especially in the 
US, has had a negative effect on microbiota, and contributed to anxiety, obesity, and 
depression (Rosenberg, 2014). Cutting back on use of hand-sanitizer, perhaps 
counterintuitively, has become an important part of being mentally healthy. Equally 
counterintuitive is the insight that smiles and laughter aren’t just expressions of happiness, 
but ways of cultivating it. Even if forced, the mechanical action of smiling is a way of 
elevating mood, from the outside in (Strack et al., 1988). 
There are also a number of techniques for shaping minds and social spaces that can 
benefit mental health. Again, beginning with the obvious, human beings generally benefit 
from listening well, conversing deeply, giving to others, and staying in touch with friends 
(Dunn et al., 2008; Mehl & Vazire, 2010; Baumeister et al., 2013). It is less widely known 
that cynicism, a quality sometimes celebrated as an asset, has been linked to both heart 
disease and dementia (Tolppanen, 2014), or that the kind of deep rumination about 
negative feelings often advised in popular self-help books in fact makes depressive 
symptoms worse (Rottenberg, 2014). On the other hand, expressions of positivity and self-
expressive acts, even when routinized, can be a great benefit to mental stability. Repeating 
three things you are grateful for, or doing a ‘random act of kindness’ each day, for example, 
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can have a lasting positive effect (Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Lyubomirsky et al., 
2005), as can journaling and other kinds of self-expressive writing (Gortner et al., 2006). 
Finally, where possible, it is beneficial to arrange your physical environment in 
certain ways. For one, it is now thought that chronic stress causes long-term changes in the 
brain, which can predispose one to anxiety and mood disorders (Chetty, 2014). Regulating 
noise, temperature, and crowding in the workplace are everyday ways to combat this. 
Spending time outside and listening to music are also effective ways of reducing stress 
(Ryan et al., 2010; Sherman et al., 2010).  And reducing the time spent in front of screens, 
especially before bed, is also becoming an increasingly urgent issue in our modern, 
nocturnal, media-saturated lives (Lin et al., 2012). 
For many, implementing all these therapeutic techniques at once will not be enough 
to ameliorate their symptoms, without perhaps therapy or medication. Sometimes, there is 
no known solution whatsoever. Still, for many others, ecological solutions are not known or 
trusted as methods of psychiatric care—and it is this latter problem that most concerns me 
here. Whether attending therapy or starting a regimen of probiotics, bettering oneself is an 
ecological process. It requires attending to a wide cognitive system, deeply integrated with 
the outside world, often via methods that do not look much like the work of Rodin’s 
thinker. As a philosopher this is welcome news; my reflective skills are probably of better 
use elsewhere anyway! 
 
4. Concluding Remarks: Better Than Well, and Smarter Than We Think 
Not everyone reflexively resists the idea that there is more to the mind than the contents of 
the skin and skull.
38
 One public defender of ecological ideas worth mentioning is science 
writer Clive Thompson. In his recent book Smarter than You Think, Thompson defends 
the idea that integrating advanced technologies like movie preference algorithms and 
search engines into our cognitive landscapes is not only acceptable or natural, but in many 
ways an improvement on our abilities and selves (Thompson, 2013). There are also those 
who are sympathetic to the idea that human enhancement, of which the process of 
                                                            
38
 For example, some philosophers of psychiatry worry that psychiatric therapies somehow change our human 
nature by making us “technological beings” (Phillips, 2013). 
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psychiatric therapy is often an example, is no less natural or immoral than any other kind 
of change. In his book, Better than Well, Carl Elliott argues that in fact, at least in 
contemporary discourse in the United States, people are actually surprisingly open to the 
idea of enhancement. As he puts it, 
“…our ambivalence about so many enhancement technologies is often 
ambivalence about the kinds of people we want to be. The question is not 
just whether there is any moral cost to the quest to become better, but 
whether there is any moral cost to the quest to become different. If we have 
mixed feelings about accent-reduction clinics, cosmetic surgery, or Prozac, 
this is partly because we have mixed feelings about the visions of the good 
life these technologies serve” (p. 17, 2003, italics in original). 
This complicated intersection of ideas—between agency, and wellness, and human 
nature—often gets cached out in terms of values, in the philosophical literature. We have 
taken for granted until now that there is inherent value in reducing or eliminating the 
burden of mental illness, which is what makes psychiatric therapy an easy case. But figuring 
out how therapy is best realized often involves negotiating a wider landscape of valuing—
and values can conflict. 
At a first gloss, one is a successful agent when one is in some sense self-directed, or 
acting in line with ones values. Perhaps, if those values stand up to some appropriate 
standards, and an individual succeeds in realizing them, then ‘mentally healthy’ is just a way 
to describe that individual.
39
 This is something I would like to investigate in the future. For 
now, it is important to note one thing that we as humans cannot do. We cannot simply stop 
being ecological agents. According to the ecological picture, what I have called a ‘special 
kind of opportunity’ or ability to change in a goal-directed manner, is not just an interesting 
quirk of human cognition, but characteristic of it. As Clark writes, we are ‘soft-selves’ 
which, 
“set long-term goals, pursue some slow deliberative reasoning, and gently 
nudge the larger system in certain directions, all the while actively creating 
                                                            
39
 For more on agency and valuing see Doris (2015) and Tiberius (2008). 
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and maintaining the kinds of conditions in which the overall distributed 
cognitive economy performs at its best,” (p. 110, 2007).  
Sometimes, that process of stewardship involves annexing different elements, biological 
and non-biological, into the machinery of our minds. Sometimes we do this because we are 
sick. Sometimes we do this because we are well.
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In this project I have closely examined the nature of good clinical reasoning in clinical 
psychiatry, thinking about mental illness and mental health which: 
 
(1) is consilient with the other sciences of the mind/brain, and 
(2) employs a normative theory with properly justified evaluative standards for psychiatric 
diagnosis. 
 
Over the course of my three primary chapters, I gave three criteria for good clinical 
reasoning in psychiatry. Clinical psychiatry should: 
 
(1) strictly separate its descriptive and evaluative projects into two stages, such that notions 
of typicality do not delimit the class of mental disorders, 
(2) respect variation in what makes individuals flourish by locating mental health in the 
concerns of individual patients, and  
(3) take advantage of the unique insights of an ecological perspective of the mind in order 
to help teach us how to be better, mentally. 
 
In the space that remains, I would like to gesture at some open questions surrounding my 
arguments and highlight avenues for future research. Ultimately, I hope that extending this 
project will help shape future discussions on the nature of mental illness.  
 
 
1. Why Well-Being? 
In chapter two I argued that the kind of normative theory of mental illness a two-stage 
methodology requires would not need information about what psychological features and 
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processes are typical or atypical for human beings or any subset thereof, and further, that a 
completely descriptive taxonomy of cognitive mechanisms would be sufficient for theorists 
and clinicians at stage two. Though not stated explicitly, I take these claims to be 
substantiated by my arguments in chapter three. Since a theory which differentiates mental 
health from mental illness must be grounded in the concerns of individuals, the very notion 
of typicality with respect to a group loses its explanatory power. One might imagine that 
examining a patient’s symptoms in a clinical context will reveal both whether they are 
flourishing on their own terms, and if not, whether any typical psychological deviation 
underlies that condition. This process is of course nothing like how diagnosis is conducted 
using the DSM. As Kathryn Tabb has recently put it, the integration of psychiatric 
knowledge into therapeutics will need to be re-imagined” (Tabb, ms). 
At the end of chapter three I intimated that exactly what the right normative theory 
is for mental illness has yet to be established. As per my references to concepts like 
flourishing and well-being, I am in agreement with those theorists who believe that health is 
properly located among these and other concepts of the good life. I am interested in well-
being in particular, because of the recent successes in psychology of measuring it 
objectively. Thus a further step to make is to engage with thinkers like Dan Haybron 
(2008), Valerie Tiberius (2008; 2014), Erik Angner (2009), Anna Alexandrova (2013; 
2015) and Michael Bishop (2015), to determine whether these measures are valid, and 
what they have to reveal about mental health.  
As measures of well-being are tied closely with values satisfaction, I believe that a 
theory of mental health can be established along the same lines as Tiberius and Plakias’ 
values-based theory of well-being (2010). If a person is flourishing with respect to their 
values, then they are healthy, or something to that effect. The notion of values I have in 
mind here has much in common with Tiberius’ (2008), and also with John Doris’ notion in 
his recent work on agency (2015). As Doris puts it, values are “associated with desires that 
exhibit some degree of strength, duration, ultimacy, and non-fungibility, while playing a 
determinative-justificatory role in planning” (think, friendship, family, independence, safety, 
creativity) (p. 28, 2015).  
One upshot of a view like this, if it can be substantiated, is its synchronicity with an 
up and coming technique in clinical psychiatry called values-based practice (Fulford & Van 
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Staden, 2013). Values-based practice is “a new skills based approach to working with 
complex and conflicting values in health care that is proving to be a fast growing force at the 
practical cutting edge of the philosophy of psychiatry” (p. 385, 2013). This method is 
individualist in that it recognizes and accepts difference in individuals’ preferences and 
concerns, and that these differences will underscore differences in ways of being mentally 
ill (2013). Of course, the convergence of these concepts—well-being and values—suggests 
that one way to mediate mental health is by changing individuals’ interests themselves. I 
hinted at this possibility at the end of the second chapter, and further argument is needed 
concerning the possibility (or objectionable consequence) of a brave new world. 
 
2. Pathological Agency 
Another sticking point about the identification of mental health with a values-based notion 
of well-being concerns the possibility of ill-chosen values. Recall how, at the end of chapter 
two, I considered what the consequences might be for ‘less than fully rational’ people like 
successful psychopaths and schizophrenics. I dismissed these cases as unproblematic for 
two reasons: one, that we should allow the possibility that unconventional values truly 
facilitate well-being in some cases, and two that when it comes down to it, it is always 
possible that peoples explicitly stated values do not actually fill that role. I expect objective 
measures of well-being to substantiate this. 
Still, there is another kind of case in the neighborhood of this issue that may pose 
problems. What if it is not a person’s values which are in doubt, but their agency or 
perhaps very capacity for autonomy? Can we fail to be agents in such a way that our 
individual concerns are no longer a guide to our mental health?
1
 When does a patient fail 
to be competent? Self-reports of patients with depression and compulsions seem to 
support this possibility. Some think of depression as characterized by a “diminished 
experience of free will” (Ratcliffe, p. 574, 2013). Others note how “[r]easons for actions, 
recognized as valid from the agent’s perspective, get overridden or suspended because of 
depression and this seems idiotic to the agent herself” (Radoilska, p.1167, 2013). What is it 
about illnesses like depression and compulsion that makes them challenges to decisional 
                                                            
1
 Many thanks to John Doris and Chapman Davis Waters for interesting discussions on this issue. 
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capacity and autonomy? A passing comment from Doris in his book on agency is 
illuminating here. As he writes,  
“[t]here are frequently obvious differences between clinical and healthy 
populations, and some of the most important differences, it seems to me, 
are appropriately marked as differences in self-direction: healthy people 
control their behavior and order their lives in ways that many suffers of 
mental illness cannot… If that’s right, normal and pathological psychologies 
can sometimes be distinguished along dimensions of agency (Buss 2012: 
667–78), and it becomes tempting to suppose that the many people 
fortunate enough to enjoy some measure of mental health also enjoy, in 
some measure, the exercise of agency” (p. 34-35, 2015). 
I am of a mind to think that differences like these are compatible with an 
individualist conception of mental illness. But arguing for that claim will involve deeper 
engagement with the literature on agency itself. The question of whether mental illness and 
its treatment can be understood in terms of departures from and restorations of agency is 
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